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PREFACE 
The objective of this paper is three-fold. First, it highlights the main aspects and character-
istics of the global cotton market by analyzing developments of the past 40 years. Second, 
it identifies the policy distortions in the cotton market including their impact on prices and 
trade as well as the prospects for reform. Third, it discusses a number of policy alterna-
tives for both developing and developed cotton producing countries. 
The paper is divided into four parts. The first part (5 sections) discusses nature of 
the fiber market, the global balance of the cotton market, price trends and variability, the 
nature and degree of dependence of developing countries on cotton, nonconventional cot-
ton production practices, and the secondhand clothing market. 
The second part (4 sections) deals with distortions and reforms in the cotton market. 
Specifically the first section discusses the distortions in the cotton market by major pro-
ducers including the United States, the European Union, China, and Uzbekistan. The next 
section summarizes the preferential arrangements that indirectly affect the cotton market, 
namely the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing and the Africa Growth and Opportunity 
Act. The third section looks at the impact of distortions and prospects for reforms. The last 
section discusses the reforms initiatives in East and West Africa. 
The third part of the paper synthesizes the issues and stylized facts. It also discusses 
some policy directions for both developing and developed cotton producing countries in-
cluding cotton promotion, deepening of policy reforms in developing countries and reduc-
tion (and eventual elimination) of support by major subsidizers. 
The fourth part consists of five technical appendices and one statistical appendix. 
The technical appendices describe the methodology of calculating the concentration indi-
ces, the model which estimates the growth rates, the measures of price variability, the 
measure of world price, and issues related to cotton risk management. The statistical ap-
pendix consists of 13 tables reporting figures on the global balance of production, con-
sumption, and trade, monthly prices since 1950, global production and consumption of 
chemical fibers, value of exports of secondhand clothing, a chronology of the US commod-
ity programs with cotton provisions, and data on subsidies.   — v —
SUMMARY 
The value of world cotton production in 2000/01 has been estimated at about $20 billion, 
down from $35 billion in 1996/97 when cotton prices were 50 percent higher. Although cot-
ton’s share in world merchandize trade is insignificant (about 0.12 percent), it is very im-
portant to a number of developing countries. Cotton accounts for approximately 40 per-
cent of total merchandise export earnings in Benin and Burkina Faso, and 30 percent in 
Chad, Mali, and Uzbekistan. Its contribution to GDP in these and other developing coun-
tries is substantial ranging between 5 and 10 percent. Cotton supports the livelihoods of 
millions in developing countries (at least 10 million in West and Central Africa) where it is 
a typical, and often dominant, smallholder cash crop. The cotton market also has been sub-
ject to considerable market intervention—subsidization in the US and EU and taxation in 
Africa and Central Asia. During the last three seasons, annual direct support averaged $4.5 
billion. This paper reviews the market setting and the policy issues, and also gives recom-
mendations on how developed and developing cotton producing countries can improve 
the policy environment. 
THE MARKET SETTING 
Global cotton production doubled from 10 million tons in 1960 to 20 million tons in 2001. 
More than three-quarters of cotton output is accounted for by developing countries. China 
and the United States each account for approximately 20 percent of world output, fol-
lowed by India (12 percent), Pakistan (8 percent), and Uzbekistan (5 percent). Other sig-
nificant producers are seven Francophone African countries, Turkey, Brazil, Australia, and 
Greece accounting for a combined 20 percent. Most of the growth in cotton production 
came from China and India which tripled and doubled their production during this 40-
year period, respectively. Other countries which significantly increased their share of cot-
ton production were Turkey, Greece, and Pakistan. Some new entrants also contributed to 
this growth. Australia, for example, produced only 2,000 tons of cotton in 1960 while it av-
eraged 650,000 tons during the late 1990s. Francophone Africa started with less than 
100,000 tons in the 1960s and it now produces almost one million tons. The United States 
and the Central Asia Republics (then part the Soviet Union), which were the two dominant 
cotton producers during the 1960s, have retained their output levels at about 3.5 and 1.5 
million tons respectively, thereby halving their shares. A number of Central America 
countries, on the other hand, lost substantial share of world output. 
Approximately, one-third of cotton production is traded internationally. The four 
dominant exporters—United States, Uzbekistan, Francophone Africa, and Australia—
account for more than two-thirds of global exports. Four major producers, China, India, 
Pakistan, and Turkey are generally net importers of cotton to supply their textile indus-
tries. Imports of cotton are more uniformly distributed than exports. During the 2000/01 
season, the eight largest importers (Indonesia, India, Mexico, Thailand, Turkey, Russia, It-
aly, Korea), accounted for over half of world cotton imports. Apart from Russia, which   — vi —
prior to 1990 was considered a major producer but not an importer since the Central Asian 
cotton production was considered domestic trade, most of the remaining cotton importers 
are new in the sense that have been importing cotton to supply their newly-developed tex-
tile industries. Four East Asian textile producers (Indonesia, Thailand, Taiwan, and Korea) 
accounted for less than 3 percent of world cotton imports in 1960. Their share in 2002 was 
22 percent. 
A recent survey (based on a questionnaire of 28 cotton producing countries) on 
costs of cotton production suggests that West Africa (especially Benin, Mali, and Burkina 
Faso), Uganda, Tanzania, are among the lowest cost producers. High cost producing coun-
tries are the United States, Israel, and Syria. The two European cotton producers, Greece 
and Spain, are probably the world’s highest cost cotton producers although they did not 
participate in the survey. 
In line with most primary commodities, real cotton prices have declined considera-
bly during the last half century; they are currently one fifth of their 1950 levels. This de-
cline has been characterized by considerable year-to-year variability, especially during the 
last quarter of the century. In particular, cotton prices followed a smooth declining pattern 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s. They increased sharply after the 1973 and begun declin-
ing again albeit with much higher volatility than the pre-1973 decline. A structural break 
in cotton prices appears to have taken place in 1985 when the United States changed the 
nature of its support policies—from stockholding to price support. Real prices have been 
declining less rapidly since 1985, while volatility has been reduced compared to 1973-1984. 
However, the post-1985 price volatility is about twice as high compared to the pre-1973 
price volatility. 
The cotton market has been significantly affected by the rapid expansion of chemi-
cal fibers, mainly polyester. Chemical fibers account currently for almost 60 percent of 
global fiber consumption, up from 33 percent in 1960. Global production of chemical fibers 
reached 30 million tons in 2002. Polyester prices were 4 times higher than cotton prices in 
the early 1960s. Following technological improvements they declined to the level of cotton 
prices in the early 1970s and since then polyester and cotton products have been trading at 
similar price levels. Most chemical fibers are produced in Asia. For example, Asia’s output 
of chemical fibers in 1960 was 2.4 million tons while global production in that year stood at 
10.3 million tons; it reached 20 million tons in 2000 compared to 28.3 million tons of global 
output. 
The long term decline in cotton prices has been aided by technological improve-
ments such as application of improved varieties, fertilizers, chemicals, irrigation, and (in 
the case of some developed countries) mechanical harvesting. Between 1960 and 2000 
world cotton yields doubled, from 300 to 600 kilograms per hectare, implying an annual 
growth rate of 1.8 percent. More recent developments in technology such as genetically 
modified seeds and precision farming are likely to further reduce the costs of producing 
cotton. In 2002, genetically modified cotton accounted for almost 30 percent of global cot-  — vii —
ton output. The United States is the heaviest user with more than 70 percent of its cotton 
area allocated to genetically modified cotton, followed by Australia (40 percent), China (20 
percent) and more recently by India. If current trends continue, half of the world’s cotton 
will be of genetically modified origin within five years. Organic cotton, another “non-
conventional” way of producing cotton, has been tried on a limited scale; the outlook, 
however, looks less promising compared to food crops mainly because of weak demand; it 
appears that there is too great a distance between the primary commodity—cotton—and 
the final product—cloth—in the eyes of the consumer. 
Cotton consumption between 1960 and 2000 grew by an annual average of 1.8 per-
cent, i.e. approximately at the same rate as the population growth, implying zero per cap-
ita growth. Consumption of chemical fibers, on the other hand, has grown by 4.7 percent 
per annum (or about 3 percent in per capita terms). Therefore, all per capita growth in to-
tal fiber consumption during the last 40 years has been accounted for by growth in the 
consumption of chemical fibers. 
THE POLICY SETTING 
Although there are no significant border policies such as quotas or high tariffs, a number 
of cotton producing countries use domestic measures to support their cotton sector. Ac-
cording to the International Cotton Advisory Committee, support during the 2001/2002 to-
taled $5.8 billion. These numbers, however, must be treated with caution for two reasons. 
First, China has reportedly supported its cotton sector by an estimated $1.3 billion annu-
ally during the last three seasons, but it is difficult to substantiate such support since Chi-
nese cotton policies are too complex to be assessed quantitatively and the official figures 
are sometimes unreliable. Second, the ICAC figures for the United States do not include all 
types of transfers. A more comprehensive look indicates that US support is higher than 
what ICAC reports. 
Support in the United States is given in various forms. The six most important 
components of support are the loan deficiency payments, marketing loan program, pro-
duction flexibility contracts (i.e. decoupled support introduced with the 1996 Farm Bill 
which replaced deficiency payments), counter-cyclical payments (i.e. emergency payments 
introduced in 1998 in response to low prices), insurance, and Step-2 payments (often re-
ferred to as export subsidies.) During the 2001/02 season producer prices in the United 
States were 91 percent higher than world prices. Support in the European Union (i.e. 
Greece, and Spain) is given in the form of guarantee prices (i.e. the difference between a 
pre-announced target price and the market price). During the 2001/02 season producer 
prices in Greece and Spain were 144, and 184 per cent higher than world price, respec-
tively. 
The current low cotton prices, which have been influenced by the support provided 
by major players, have taken a toll on the rural sector of cotton-dependent countries. Re-
search findings indicate that in Benin, where cotton accounts for 40 percent of total mer-  — viii —
chandise exports and contributes more than 7 percent to GDP, a 40 percent reduction in 
farmgate cotton prices—equivalent to the price decline that took place from December 
2000 to May 2002—implies a 7 percent reduction in rural per capita income in the short 
run and 5-6 percent reduction in the long run. Furthermore, the incidence of poverty 
among cotton growers in the short run rises from 37 percent to 59 percent while the aver-
age incidence of rural poverty (i.e. including cotton growers and other farmers) rises from 
40 percent to 48 percent. 
In addition to low prices and loss of export shares by non-subsidizing producers, 
support by major players has triggered a number of noteworthy reactions. 
  Many cotton producing countries have reacted by introducing offsetting support. 
Turkey, Brazil, Mexico, Egypt, and India, totaled $0.6 billion of support during 
2001/02. 
  Brazil has initiated a WTO consultation process claiming losses to its cotton exports 
due to subsidies by the United States. 
  Four West African cotton producing countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali) 
are pressing for removal of support to cotton sector through the WTO. In an unusual 
move, the President of Burkina Faso addressed the WTO on June 10, 2003, asking for 
financial compensation for cotton producing low-income countries to offset the in-
jury caused by support. The requested compensation was to be in place for as long as 
subsidies are in place. 
  The cotton sector has found an unlikely ally in the Director General of the Interna-
tional Rayon and Synthetic Fibres Committee. In a letter to the Financial Times on 
June 12, 2003 he complained that “recent increases in cotton subsidies have rigged 
the market even more dramatically in favor of cotton, depressing demand for every 
substitute product. The result is industrial plants being kept idle… that were built in 
legitimate expectation that the competitive advantages of manufactured fibers 
would create demand to fill the capacity…” 
Removal of support is expected to reduce production and consequently boost 
prices. Simulations show that if full liberalization in the cotton sector takes place including 
removal of both trade barriers and production support (along with liberalization in all 
other commodity sectors), cotton prices would increase in the next 10 years by an average 
of 12.7 percent over the price that would have prevailed in the absence of reforms. World 
cotton trade would increase by 5.8 percent while Africa’s cotton exports would increase by 
12.6 percent. Uzbekistan would increase its exports by 5.8 percent, Australia by 2.7 per-
cent, while exports from the United States would decline by 3.5 percent. Cotton produc-
tion in the Unites States and the European Union would decline by 6.7 and 70.5 percent, 
respectively—in effect, cotton production in the European Union would fall to levels even 
below those prior to the Common Agricultural Policy taking effect. Production in Uzbeki-
stan and Africa would increase by 4 and 6 percent, respectively. 
However, complete elimination of support is unlikely. The European Union re-
formed its cotton policy regime in 1999 and is unlikely to eliminate support because: (i)   — ix —
none of the candidates to join the Union in the current expansion are cotton producers and 
hence there will be no pressure to increase the budgetary allocation to the cotton sector 
and (ii) the current cotton program is viewed as a poverty reduction mechanism since the 
support supposedly goes to low-income regions of Southern Europe. The United States 
approved the 2002 Farm Bill which, in effect, legitimized the emergency payments that had 
been given to its cotton (and other commodity) growers following the 1997/98 price de-
cline; it also established a minimum price of $0.71 per pound (or $1.56 per kilogram, much 
higher than the 2001 and 2002 world averages of $1.06 and $1.00 per kilogram). The 2002 
Farm Bill will be in place for the next 6 years, consequently guaranteeing US cotton grow-
ers generous support until the year 2007, if the current low prices persist (some support 
will be in place even if prices increase considerably). 
The cotton market has also been affected indirectly by the Agreement on Textiles 
and Clothing (the successor of the Multifibre Arrangement), which through quotas and 
tariffs on textiles and apparel has influenced the location of the textile industry, conse-
quently imposing an implicit tax on cotton goods. The Agreement is expected to be phased 
out by the end of 2004. However, it is back-loaded with most of the reforms expected to 
take place at the end of 2004, thus introducing the risk of non-compliance. The Africa 
Growth and Opportunity Act may also help many African cotton producing countries to 
expand their textile exports to the United States and thereby increase domestic cotton con-
sumption. For example, currently, the average duty to garment imports into the US is 17.5 
percent. Under the Act, apparel imports into the United States from the 14 eligible African 
countries will be duty free subject to an upper limit of 3 percent of total US apparel im-
ports. Since total trade in clothing from Africa to the US is very small, the 3 percent cap (to 
increase to 7 percent by year 7) is unlikely to become a binding constraint. Another benefi-
cial provision is that for countries with Less Developed status, there is a 4-year exception 
to the rule of origin (it expires in 2004). For example under this provision, Tanzania, can 
import yarn from China and export cloth to the US. However, it should be noted that 
while local cotton consumption may increase due to the Act, global consumption is 
unlikely to be affected in any significant way. 
A number of cotton producing countries (especially in Sub-Saharan Africa) which 
traditionally had been taxing their cotton sectors, undertook substantial policy reforms 
during the 1990s in order to increase the efficiency of the cotton sectors. These reforms 
have been supported, in part, by multilateral institutions, including the World Bank. In 
most occasions reforms were the only feasible alternative because the parastatals handling 
the marketing and trade of cotton were crippled by huge debts and either went bankrupt 
or they managed to stay alive with state infusions of capital. This, in turn, was caused by 
falling world cotton prices, inefficiencies and poor management of the parastatals and of-
ten outright corruption. 
Substantial reforms were undertaken by countries in Eastern and Southern Africa, 
namely Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. With the exception of Tanzania   — x —
(where the reform process was never completed), considerable supply response took place 
along with higher share of export prices and timely payments to growers. There have been 
numerous reports that the quality of cotton declined after reforms, but these reports have 
been unsubstantiated. West African cotton producers are also contemplating reforms. Cen-
tral Asian cotton producers, especially Uzbekistan, still tax heavily their cotton sectors and 
reforms are unlikely to take place soon. 
MARKET OUTLOOK AND POLICY OPTIONS 
The prospects for growth in cotton consumption are similar to the patterns followed in 
earlier decades. Pressure from chemical fibers is likely to remain strong as technological 
improvements are likely to enhance their properties and reduce the costs of production. A 
growing second-hand clothing market, especially in developing countries, has displaced 
(and is likely to further displace) potential demand growth for new garments in these 
markets. Therefore, consumption growth is unlikely to exceed the projected population 
growth of 1.2 percent. Prices, on the other hand, while they are expected to recover from 
the record lows experienced during the 2001 and 2002, are unlikely to reach the highs of 
the 1970s (or even the mid-1990s). Given modest consumption growth and poor price 
prospects, reducing the costs of production is an imperative for the cotton-dependent de-
veloping countries in order for them to increase (or at least sustain) their share in global 
cotton demand. On many occasions, that would entail further policy reforms. 
Undoubtedly, the price prospects (and consequently the export shares of low cost 
producers, including many African countries) can be improved considerably if support by 
developed countries is reduced substantially or eliminated altogether. However, given the 
low probability of outright elimination of support, a second best alternative would be for 
support to be given in a non-distortionary manner. A type of support with minimal distor-
tionary effects—the so-called decoupled support mechanisms—has re-gained popularity 
recently. Income transfers under decoupled support are based on past production levels 
and prices and thus have minimal impact on current production decisions—at least in the-
ory. What makes decoupled support in the cotton sector an interesting (and potentially 
applicable) alternative is that almost all support is in the form of domestic measures. 
Therefore, changing the nature of support does not require changing the sources of fund-
ing such support as it would in the case of border measures. 
Decoupled support was attempted in the European Union with the Common Agri-
cultural Policy reform of 1992, in Mexico with the PROCAMPO program of 1994, and in 
the United States with the Freedom to Farm Act of 1996. The outcome of these programs 
has not been encouraging because these schemes did not include three essential elements 
that would make them successful: (i) substituting all existing support mechanisms with 
decoupled support; (ii) limiting the duration of the programs which would have made 
them true transition mechanisms and (iii) not requiring that land remain in agricultural 
use which would reduce the overall supply of the commodities under consideration and   — xi —
hence lift world prices. Unless these conditions are met, any attempts to restore the credi-
bility of decoupled support policies and ultimately remove support to the cotton (and 
other) sector(s) are unlikely to have the intended beneficial impact.   — xii —
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PART I:  THE MARKET SETTING 
THE FIBER MARKET 
Fibers include a wide variety of products which can be divided into two broad categories: 
natural and man-made (see figure 1).1 Natural fibers can be further divided into fibers of 
plant-origin (such as cotton and linen) and fibers of animal-origin (such as wool and silk). 
Likewise, man-made fibers can be further divided into inorganic and organic fibers. Inor-
ganic fibers are materials such as ceramic, glass, and carbon (typically not used in gar-
ments.) Organic man-made fibers, on the other hand, are mostly used in garment produc-
tion either as substitutes or as complements to natural fibers. Organic fibers are further 
sub-divided into natural and synthetic polymers. Natural polymers (often called cellu-
losic) are made from pulp (i.e. wood). The most common natural polymer is viscose, also 
known as rayon. The synthetic polymers are made from crude oil. The most common syn-
thetic polymers are polyester, acrylic, and polyamide (also known as nylon). It is interest-
ing to note the continuum of fibers in terms of their level of chemical transformation of the 
raw material. At one end of the spectrum are the natural fibers with minimal chemical 
transformation. In the middle are natural polymers with some degree of chemical trans-
formation. At the other end of the spectrum are synthetic polymers with substantial de-
gree of chemical transformation. 
Cotton—by far the most common natural fiber of the 19th and 20th centuries—has 
been used as a raw material for clothing for at least 5,000 years. Its use expanded signifi-
cantly after the invention of the ginnery in 1793 (which introduced mechanical separation 
of seed and lint consequently reducing the costs of producing cotton lint) and the indus-
trial revolution which reduced the cost of producing textiles. 
Although commercial production of man-made fibers on a large scale is a post-
WWII phenomenon, experimentation was taking place as early as the late 1800s. Man-
made fibers first appeared in the market earlier in the 20th century. In 1925, for example, 
rayon accounted for 1.6 percent of the world’s total fiber consumption. Its share increased 
to 11.8 percent 20 years later.2 Global production of cotton and chemical fibers reached 20 
and 30 million tons, respectively, in 2000. The dominant chemical fiber producer is China 
accounting for 6.7 million tons, followed by the European Union, the US, and Taiwan with 
3.4, 3.3, and 3.2 million tons, respectively. 
Between 1960 and 2002, man-made fiber consumption increased at an annual rate of 
4.7 percent. Cotton consumption during this period increased only 1.8 percent. Per capita 
chemical fiber consumption in 1960 and 2000 was 1.75 and 4.52 kilograms, respectively. 
The share of man-made fiber consumption is currently 57 percent, up from 22 percent in 
1960; cotton’s share fell to 40 percent in 2002 (see figure 2). 
Prices of non-cellulosic man-made fibers have typically traded at comparable levels 
with cotton since the early 1970s. Between 1960 and 1972, the polyester price indicator de-  — 2 —
clined form $12 per kilogram to $2.50 per kilogram, mainly a reflection of the technological 
improvements (and consequently cost reductions) that took place in the chemical fiber in-
dustry. After reaching parity with the A Index in 1972, the ratio of polyester to A Index has 
increased at an average rate of 1 percent per year, implying that while cotton and polyes-
ter are priced at similar levels, polyester has made small pricing gains (see figure 3). 
THE GLOBAL COTTON BALANCE 
Production, Consumption, and Stocks 
Cotton is produced in many countries but the northern hemisphere accounts for 90 percent 
of global output and more than two thirds of cotton is produced by developing countries. 
During the last 4 decades cotton production grew at an annual average rate of 1.8 percent 
to reach 20 million tons in 2001 from 10.2 million tons in 1960. Most of this growth came 
from China and India which tripled and doubled their production, respectively, during 
this 40-year period. Other countries which significantly increased their share of cotton 
production were Turkey, Greece, and Pakistan. Some “new entrants” also contributed to 
this growth. Australia, for example, produced only 2,000 tons of cotton in 1960 while it av-
eraged 650,000 tons during the late 1990s. Francophone Africa produced less than 100,000 
tons in the 1960s and now produces almost one million tons. The United States and the 
Central Asia Republics (then the Soviet Union), the two dominant cotton producers during 
the 1960s, have maintained their output levels at about 3.5 and 1.5 million tons respec-
tively, thereby halving their shares. A number of central America countries which used to 
produce almost 250,000 tons of cotton, now produce virtually none. The share of East Afri-
can cotton producers has declined considerably during this period. The concentration of 
production has been declining since its 1984 peak, when China became an important 
player in the cotton market, mainly reflecting increased production by the new entrants 
(see appendix A for definition and calculation of concentration). 
During the 1990s, cotton production fluctuated between 18 and 20 million tons with 
no significant trend. China and the United States each accounted for approximately 20 
percent of world output, followed by India (12 percent), Pakistan (8 percent), and Uzbeki-
stan (5 percent). Other significant cotton producers are the countries of Francophone Af-
rica, Turkey, Brazil, Australia, and Greece which account for a combined 18 percent of 
global output. The remaining share is accounted for by a number of smaller producers. 
The consumption pattern of cotton is primarily determined by the size of the textile 
industries of the dominant cotton consumers. China, the leading textile producer, ab-
sorbed more than one quarter of global cotton output during the late 1990s. Other major 
textile producers (and hence major cotton consumers) are India, the United States, and 
Turkey, which together (including China) account for three-quarters of global cotton con-
sumption. A number of East Asian countries have emerged recently as important cotton 
consumers. For example, Indonesia, Thailand, Korea, and Taiwan consumed only 130 
thousand tons in 1960 (1.2 percent of global consumption) while they consumed 1.5 mil-  — 3 —
lion tons in 2002 (7.2 percent of global consumption). That is also reflected in the concen-
tration pattern of consumption which increased by 2 percentage points during the 1990s. 
Growth in the demand for cotton has been slow. Between 1960 and 2000, cotton 
demand has grown at the same rate as population (1.8 percent per annum) implying that 
per capita cotton consumption has remained stagnant. A contrasting view of total and per 
capita cotton consumption is vividly illustrated in figures 4 and 5. 
Stocks, which have historically fluctuated between 20 and 50 percent of global out-
put, have affected the cotton market considerably, especially price variability. Major 
stockholders are the United States and China. Consequently, the stockholding policies of 
these two countries have affected the level and volatility of cotton prices. Two major cot-
ton de-stocking episodes are associated with periods of considerable price variability: the 
1985 shift in US policy from stockholding to price support and the 1999 reforms in China. 
Trade 
One-third of cotton production is traded internationally. The four dominant exporters—
US, Uzbekistan, Francophone Africa, and Australia—account for more than two-thirds of 
the world’s exports. Four major producers, China, India, Pakistan, and Turkey do not ex-
port cotton and occasionally import to supply their textile industries. Imports of cotton are 
more uniformly distributed than exports. 
During the 2000/01 season, the eight largest importers (Indonesia, India, Mexico, 
Thailand, Turkey, Russia, Italy, Korea) accounted for over half of world cotton imports. 
Apart from Russia, which prior to 1990 was considered a major producer but not an im-
porter because the Central Asian cotton production was considered internal trade, most of 
the remaining cotton importers are new in the sense that have been importing cotton to 
supply their newly-developed textile industries. For example, four East Asian textile pro-
ducers (Indonesia, Thailand, Taiwan (China), and Korea) accounted for less than 3 percent 
of world cotton imports in 1960, compared to 22 percent in 2002. 
The import concentration index fluctuated around 5 percent during the late 1990s 
versus an export concentration of 10 percent. The corresponding indices during the 1960s 
were 7 and 12 percent, respectively, indicating that cotton trade is less concentrated than 
before despite the fact that trade as a percent of global output has not changed appreciably 
during this period. 
In terms of direction of trade flows, 44 percent of cotton exports went from indus-
trial to developing countries during 2000/01. The shares for 1980/81 and 1990/91 were 38 
and 31 percent. The shares of cotton exports from developing to developing countries in-
creased from 13 percent in 1980/81 to 31 percent in 2000/01. This change in the pattern of 
trade flows reflects the growth of the textile industries in South-East Asia. 
Costs of Production 
The International Cotton Advisory Committee collects data comparing costs of production   — 4 —
among cotton producers. In its most recent (2001) survey, based on a questionnaire of 28 
cotton producing countries, it suggests that West Africa (especially Benin, Mali, and Burk-
ina Faso), Uganda, and Tanzania, are among the lowest cost cotton producers. High cost 
producers are the United States, Israel, and Syria. The two European cotton producers, 
Greece and Spain, are probably the world’s highest cost cotton producers although they 
did not participate in the survey. 
Calculating and comparing the costs of producing cotton in various countries is, 
admittedly, a difficult task as it would involve a number of assumptions about the cost of 
land and capital as well as various hidden subsidies and distortions. As the publication 
warns, “The data must be used carefully. Differences in production practices, variations in 
the input supply among countries and direct and indirect technical and financial support 
to farmers in the form of free seed, technical advise, etc. makes comparisons difficult 
among countries.” (p. 5). 
The Long Term Outlook 
The average population growth for the current decade is projected at 1.2 percent per an-
num. In the absence of any policy reforms by major players ICAC (2003) projects that con-
sumption during the current decade is expected to be about 1.8 percent per annum, imply-
ing that by 2010 world cotton consumption will be 23.6 million tons. However, that may be 
viewed as an optimistic scenario considering that during the last 15 years cotton consump-
tion grew by an annual rate of 0.7 percent. 
PRICE TRENDS AND VARIABILITY 
Real cotton prices have followed a declining pattern albeit subject to temporary spikes and 
troughs, a pattern that has been consistent throughout the last two centuries.3 The reasons 
for the long-term decline of cotton prices are similar to those characterizing the price de-
clines in most primary commodities, namely, reduction in the costs of production due to 
technological improvements, slow demand growth, and strong competition from chemical 
fibers. The declining pattern of cotton prices has not been smooth and it appears that a 
structural break has taken place in the mid-1980s (see figure 6). Between 1960 and 1984 
real cotton prices averaged $2.62 per kilogram. Following a sharp decline in 1984 (from 
$2.45 per kilogram in 1984 to $1.83 in 1985 and $1.27 in 1986), they have been fluctuating 
around an average of $1.49/kg in the post-1985 period. There has been a declining trend of 
about 0.9 percent per annum between 1985 and 2002 (as opposed to only 0.2 percent dur-
ing 1960-84).4 
Reductions in the costs of production have been primarily associated with yield in-
creases which during the last 40 years have doubled, from 300 kilograms per hectare in the 
early 1960s to 600 kilograms per hectare in the late 1990s. The phenomenal yield growth 
was aided primarily by the introduction of improved cotton varieties, expansion of irriga-
tion, use of chemicals and fertilizers, and mechanical harvesting.5 To these improvements   — 5 —
one should add developments in genetically modified seed technology and precision 
farming during the late-1990s, which are expected to further reduce the costs of produc-
tion. Other innovations in the transportation and the information technology sectors have 
reduced costs of transporting cotton and also reduced the need for large stockholding. 
Substantial technological improvements have also taken place in the textile sectors 
whereby the same quality of fabric can be achieved with much lower quality of cotton, a 
trend that holds for many products whose main input is a primary commodity. 
The principal reason behind the 1984/85 decline in cotton prices was the structural 
shift of the support policy by the United States and the shift in China’s trade policy 
(McDonald 1997). During the 1950s, the US Commodity Credit Corporation bought and 
sold most of the US cotton. For example, between 1962 and 1966, the Credit Corporation 
accounted for almost two-thirds of cotton carry-over. While its role was reduced after 
1970, the US would still account for 35 percent of non-Chinese stocks. Following the 1985 
Farm Bill, the loan rates (i.e. the equivalent of a minimum prices) were substantially re-
duced and most of the US stocks were released and found their way into the world mar-
ket. This year also marked the initiation of large exports by China, which for the previous 
20 years was a net importer. In fact between 1980 and 1985, China went from the world’s 
largest importer to the world’s largest exporter.6 
During the 1990s, nominal cotton prices, as measured by the Cotlook A Index, fluc-
tuated between $2.53 per kilogram (May 1995) and $0.97 per kilogram (December 1999). 
The post-1996 decline in cotton prices was a result of a number of factors: first, there was 
excess production during the 1997/98 season. Second, demand was weak, especially from 
the East Asian textile producers affected by the financial crisis of 1997—Indonesia, Repub-
lic of Korea, and Thailand. Together these countries account for more than 15 percent of 
cotton import demand. Third, stocks rose to a record 9.8 million tons in 1997/98, which 
pushed the stock-to-use ratio to 0.51, the highest ratio since 1985/86. Fourth, low synthetic 
fibers prices, which were a result of currency devaluations in several East Asian chemical 
fiber producers. Between January 1997 and January 1998 the South Korean polyester fiber 
indicator price declined from $1.66 to $0.79 per kilogram. The strength of the US dollar 
during that period also contributed to the price declines. 
It appeared that cotton prices would have a sustained recovery when they reached 
$1.45 per kilogram in December 2000—up 45 percent from a year earlier (see figure 7). 
However, the recovery was short-lived since it mainly reflected the 1998/99 weather-
related short-fall in the US crop. In the 1998/99 season, US cotton output was a little over 3 
million tons compared to an average of 4 million tons in the preceding 5-year period. With 
production and consumption for the 2001/02 season at 21.1 and 19.9 million tons, implying 
a surplus of 1.2 million tons, cotton prices have been under intense pressure. The A Index 
declined to $0.82 per kilogram in October 2001, which, excluding August 1986, is the low-
est since November 1972. 
In addition to their declining pattern, cotton prices have been volatile. The nature of   — 6 —
volatility, however, has changed considerably during the last 40 years. A simple measure 
of volatility shows that during 1985-2002 volatility was 2.5 times higher compared with 
1960-72, but half compared to the 1973-84 period (see Appendix C for calculation and 
comments on volatility). Note that 1973 reflects the commodity price boom while 1985 co-
incides with the US change in cotton policy regime and the subsequent disposal of large 
cotton stocks. 
COTTON AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Although cotton is insignificant on a global scale (it accounts for only 0.12 percent of total 
merchandise trade), it is an important cash crop to a number of developing countries at 
both farm and national level. For example, cotton accounted for between 30 and 44 percent 
for total merchandize exports in 5 West African cotton producing countries (Burkina Faso, 
Benin, Chad, Mali, Togo) during 1998-99. The corresponding figures for Uzbekistan, Taji-
kistan, and Turkmenistan was 32, 15, and 12 percent, respectively. Cotton’s contribution to 
the GDP of these countries has been substantial, ranging between 3.6 percent (Turkmeni-
stan) and 8.2 percent (Tajikistan). With the exception of Turkmenistan, the per capita an-
nual GDP in these countries is well below $500. In most of these countries (especially in 
Africa) cotton is typically a smallholder crop, it is the main cash crop, it is grown in rainfed 
land and the use of purchased inputs such as chemicals and fertilizers is minimal. 
According to FAO estimates, there were 100 million rural households involved in 
cotton production worldwide during 2001. In China, India, and Pakistan about 45, 10, and 
7 million rural households, respectively were engaged in cotton production. The total 
number of rural households depending on cotton in major African producing countries, 
including Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Mali, and Zimbabwe totaled 6 million. 
The high dependence on cotton in these countries has important poverty ramifica-
tions, especially when large price changes take place. In a study which focused on Benin, 
Minot and Daniels (2002) found that a 40 percent reduction in farmgate cotton prices—
equivalent to the price decline that took place from December 2000 to May 2002—implied 
a 7 percent reduction in rural per capita income in the short run and 5-6 percent reduction 
in the long run. They also found that the incidence of poverty among cotton growers rose 
in the short run from 37 percent to 59 percent while the average incidence of rural poverty 
(i.e. including cotton growers and other farmers) rose from 40 percent to 48 percent. 
In terms of policy interventions, the cotton sector in developing countries has been 
traditionally taxed either explicitly through export taxes or implicitly through oligopsonis-
tic arrangements or exchange rate misalignments. The pattern, however, has changed 
somewhat during the 1990s as a number of cotton producers undertook reforms. How-
ever, several African and all Central Asian cotton producers still tax their cotton sectors. 
NON-CONVENTIONAL COTTON PRODUCTION 
Recent trends in growing cotton focus on cost reductions through less intensive use of in-  — 7 —
puts, especially chemicals. These include the use of genetically modified (GM) seed tech-
nology and organic methods of production. GM cotton has not faced the degree of opposi-
tion faced by GM food crops and this has allowed more rapid adoption. Organic cotton 
has been embraced enthusiastically by environmental activists, but not by consumers. 
Hence, while there is plenty of room for expanding GM cotton, the scope for expanding 
organic cotton appears to be limited. 
Genetically Modified Cotton 
Genetically modified (GM) cotton, a result of technological developments of the 1990s, has 
the potential of reducing the cost of production and hence increasing profitability of the 
early adopters of this technology. 
There are two types of GM cotton: Bt cotton (first used in the US in 1996) and herbi-
cide-tolerant cotton (it gained approval by the US Environmental Protection Agency in 
1998). Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis) is a naturally occurring soil bacterium that has been used 
as a biological pesticide for many years. The gene that produces an insect toxin has been 
transferred from that bacterium into the cotton plants. In turn, the plants produce their 
own toxin and there is no need for the grower to apply certain pesticides. Herbicide-
tolerant cotton is a cotton plant that has been genetically modified to resist a herbicide that 
would otherwise kill both weeds and the cotton plant. Consequently, the herbicide can be 
applied without exterminating the cotton plant. 
In economic terms, GM-type cotton (as well as all other GM products) act as insur-
ance against pests, insects, or weeds. The growers pay a premium for the resistant-seed (as 
they would when buying insurance). If the insect attacks the crop, the grower’s benefit 
comes through the lower costs from not spraying. If the insect does not attack the crop 
growers simply lose their premium (i.e. the cost difference between conventional and GM 
cotton). 
GM cotton was first grown in the United States in 1996.7 A number of cotton pro-
ducing countries have introduced GM cotton technology since then including China, In-
dia, and Mexico in the northern hemisphere and Argentina, Australia, and South Africa in 
the southern hemisphere. Other countries are in the process of approval or at the trial 
stage, including Israel, Pakistan, Turkey, Brazil, and Indonesia. Major producers that have 
not used or approved GM cotton (as of 2003) are the European Union, Central Asia, and 
Francophone Africa (except Burkina Faso, which is conducting trials). 
It is estimated that about 22 percent of world cotton area is under GM varieties, up 
from 2 percent in 1996/97. The largest user of GM cotton is the United States, which during 
the 2003/04 season is estimated to have sown 70 percent of its cotton area with GM varie-
ties. In Australia, about 44 percent of cotton area was sown to GM varieties in 2002/03 up 
from 40 percent in 2000/01. In China, which adopted the new technology at an experimen-
tal stage in 1996, more than 20 million hectares with GM varieties were planted in 2002, 
corresponding to over 20 percent of cotton area. In addition to the imported GM varieties,   — 8 —
China has developed its own 11 GM varieties. According to Carl et al. (2001), the major 
share of the benefits from growing Bt cotton in China went to farmers (most of whom are 
small-holders).8 This is because the Chinese cotton varieties were developed using public 
funds. In contrast, most of the benefits associated with GM products in the other cotton 
producing countries go to biotech and seed companies. 
If the conversion to GM cotton varieties continues at rates experienced during the 
last few years, in less than 5 years as much as half of world’s cotton will be of GM origin. 
That is equivalent to 40 percent of cotton area. 
Organic Cotton 
The second trend, organic cotton, may be a small market niche to be exploited by develop-
ing countries. Most developing countries can be classified as “organic” cotton producers, 
without altering their production practices, because of their low reliance on chemicals and 
fertilizer. Organic cotton potential, however, appears to be limited. Organic cotton initia-
tives have taken place in many countries, including in Africa, but the scale is still insignifi-
cant compared to global production of conventional cotton. Myers and Stolton (1999) re-
ported that in 1997, about 8,150 tons of certified organic cotton fiber was produced world-
wide, of which, 2,600 tons was produced in the US, 1,175 in India, 1,800 in Turkey, 1,570 in 
Africa, and 845 in Latin America. 
Significant expansion of organic cotton faces a number of difficulties on both the 
supply and demand side. On the supply side, the certification process (especially in Afri-
can cotton producing countries where the majority of growers are smallholders) is costly 
to implement and monitor; thus any benefits to farmers through higher prices of selling 
organic cotton and less use of chemicals are likely to be as high as the certification costs. 
On the consumption side, demand for organic cotton is not as strong as is in other com-
modities such as coffee and tea. There are three reasons for this. First, there is a “distance” 
in the eyes of the consumer between the primary product (cotton) and the final product 
(cloth). Second, consumers of clothing (as opposed to consumers of, say, beverages) must 
pay attention to a host of factors before they make their purchasing decision. The decision 
involves brand, color, style, size, type of cotton (typically identified by origin, such Peru-
vian, Egyptian, Turkish cotton), content (e.g., 80% cotton, 20% polyester), and care instruc-
tions. Adding to that already congested list information on whether cotton is of organic 
origin is rather difficult. Note that this decision making process compares unfavorably 
with much simpler labeling for, say, coffee or tea where something like “Organically 
grown from Costa Rica” or “Organic of Kenya origin” is likely to suffice. Third, organic 
products are typically associated with health-related benefits that do not apply to non-
food products such as cotton. 
THE SECONDHAND CLOTHING MARKET 
One development that reportedly has affected textile production (and hence cotton con-  — 9 —
sumption) patterns in many developing countries during the last two decades is the dra-
matic increase in the trade of secondhand clothing. Estimates of the level of secondhand 
clothing trade are not accurate, however, COMTRADE statistics—the only comprehensive 
data source—show that secondhand clothing trade grew from $0.4 billion to $1.4 billion 
between 1980 and 2000. More than half of this trade takes place from industrial to develop-
ing countries, with the United States and Germany accounting more than $300 million (see 
table F7, Appendix F). While the level of trade may seem small in value terms, it is large in 
quantity terms. For example, consider that a typical T-shirt which would be sold for more 
than $10 in the US or Europe it is sold for only $0.50 in Africa. 
The secondhand clothing trade typically originates through donations from the 
public to charitable organizations such as the Salvation Army and Goodwill Industries in 
the US, or Oxfam and Humana in Europe. Following collection, these organizations mar-
ket the cloths through normal commercial channels. Sometimes they let other companies 
use their name, subject to a fee. The secondhand clothing industry has a number of unique 
characteristics. Hansen (2000, p. 122), for example, summarized it as follows: 
The secondhand clothing trade is an unusual industry. Few other industries obtain their raw 
materials free, as do the charitable organizations, or have suppliers, the clothing donating pub-
lic, who do not know the important role they play at the start of a long commodity chain. In-
deed, the clothing-donating public is generally not aware of either the grant scale on which the 
charitable organizations commonly dispose of clothing to commercial middlemen or contract 
out the right to solicit and sell under their name. 
There are numerous (mostly supply-driven) factors behind the growth of the of sec-
ondhand clothing trade: 
•  Wealth. Consumers in high-income countries respond to changes in fashion quickly, 
hence increasing the availability of (seemingly unused) clothing. 
•  Tax incentives. When taxpayers donate to charities they often claim such donations on 
their tax returns, thus reducing their tax liabilities. 
•  Lack of Information. Because the public is often unaware that donations go through 
normal marketing channels, it probably donates more clothing that it would in the 
presence of full information disclosure. 
•  Technological improvements. Technological advancements during the last two dec-
ades have improved considerably the quality of garments thus increasing the durabil-
ity of clothing far beyond what most consumers would consider as “normal use pe-
riod.” 
•  Environmental sensitivities. Because of sensitivity with environmental issues, con-
sumers often prefer to recycle rather than dispose, even when the opportunity cost of 
recycling is not zero. 
•  Policy reforms. Liberalization of the textile industries in many low-income countries 
reduced the competitiveness of the locally produced clothing thus increasing the mar-  — 10 —
ket share of imported secondhand clothing. 
The growth of secondhand clothing trade has a number of important welfare impli-
cations. First, consumers in developing countries gain because they have access to cheaper 
clothing. Second, the supply chain industry, such as importers, traders, and merchants of 
secondhand clothing gain. Third, the domestic textile industries of the countries that im-
port secondhand clothing lose. 
Opinions on these welfare implications differ. Some argue that secondhand clothing 
is dumping and should be subjected to prohibitive tariffs. Others believe that it is just an-
other well-functioning sector albeit subject to minor trade distortions. Indeed, the tax 
credit adds an incentive to donate, thus it may be viewed as an export subsidy. Further-
more, the quantity and quality of information that the public receives when asked to do-
nate clothing may be considered implicit subsidy—had they known that clothing goes 
through normal marketing channels, at least some would have chosen not to donate. 
Apart from these two factors, however, all other aspects of the secondhand clothing indus-
try appear to be subject to normal demand and supply conditions. At the outset, the ques-
tion is a quantitative one. If, in the absence of the tax incentive and the presence of full in-
formation disclosure, people would still donate the same (or similar) amounts of clothing, 
then the subsidy (and, a fortiori, dumping) issue does not deserve merit. 
Because cotton is traded internationally with no significant border distortions (apart 
from the provisions of the Agreement of Textiles and Clothing), the location of the produc-
tion and consumption of clothing should not matter. Thus, the only way that global cotton 
consumption can be affected by secondhand clothing trade is if the removal of the tax in-
centive along with proper dissemination of information reduces the availability of second-
hand clothing considerably (i.e. secondhand clothing are destroyed).   — 11 —
PART II:  THE POLICY SETTING 
DISTORTIONS IN THE COTTON MARKET 
Cotton has been subject to various marketing and trade interventions. Townsend and 
Guitchounts (1994) estimated that in the early 1990s, more than two-thirds of cotton was 
produced in countries which had some type of government intervention, including taxa-
tion and subsidization policies—cotton producing countries with little or no government 
intervention included: Argentina, Australia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Israel, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. 
Interventions, whether taxes or supports/subsidies, have occurred (and in most 
cases still occur) through domestic market activities by state enterprises, price supports, 
and import duties or quotas. These activities result in the following broad (though not al-
ways distinct) types of distortions: 
  Taxation through a state marketing monopsony. To transfer resources from cotton pro-
ducers to the government, the state marketing agency pays fixed, below-world prices 
for cotton. This kind of intervention has been common in Central Asia, where the 
state handles both domestic marketing and international trade. In most of Franco-
phone Africa domestic enterprises, along with a French state enterprise, control cotton 
marketing and trade. 
  Taxation through border interventions. Typically to protect the domestic textile indus-
tries, the government uses border interventions to tax cotton producers. Egypt, India, 
Pakistan, and Turkey have occasionally exercised interventions of this nature. 
  Support to producers through price interventions. To increase producers’ income, cotton 
producers in the European Union receive support under the Common Agricultural 
Policy, amounting to twice the world price in some years, while U.S. cotton producers 
receive generous support. This type of intervention accounts for the greatest part of 
distortions in the global cotton market. 
  Support through border interventions. To increase producers’ income some countries, 
such as China, impose import tariffs on cotton. 
  Support through input subsidies. In addition to output distortions, several distortions in 
input markets have affected the cotton sector, most notably subsidies on credit, fertil-
izer, and irrigation. 
The International Cotton Advisory Committee (2002 and 2003), which has been 
monitoring the level of assistance to cotton production by major producers since 1997/98, 
found that eight countries provided direct support to cotton production—US, China, 
Greece, Spain, Turkey, Brazil, Mexico, Egypt. The level of direct production assistance in 
the five seasons between 1997/98 and 2001/02 ranged between $3.8 and $5.3 billion. For 
2001/02, direct assistance to US cotton producers reached $2.3 billion, China’s support to-
taled $1.2 billion, and support was $0.8 billion in the EU (Greece and Spain). Producers in   — 12 —
Turkey Brazil, Mexico, and Egypt received a combined total of $150 million in support. In-
dia also supported its cotton sector during the 2001/02 season by an estimated $0.5 billion. 
In addition to domestic support, there are some border restrictions, mainly in the 
form of import tariffs. Most countries that impose import quotas are cotton exporters, 
some with large textiles sectors. Import tariffs rates for 2003 were: Argentina (7.5 percent); 
Brazil (7.5 to 10 percent); China (3 percent within quota, 90 percent outside quota; TRQ for 
2003 was 856,250 tons, likely to be exhausted); Egypt (5 percent); India (10 percent); US (4.4 
cents/kg within quota and 31.4 cents/kg outside quota; TRQ for 2002 was 73,207 tons while 
cotton imports totaled 6,295 tons); Uzbekistan (10 percent); Zimbabwe (15 percent duty 
plus 5 percent import tax). 
The remaining of this section analyzes the structure and degree of domestic inter-
ventions in the US, EU, and China. It also looks at Uzbekistan, a country which taxes its 
cotton sector. 
The United States 
Numerous commodity programs (including cotton) exist in the United States with the ul-
timate outcome of transferring resources from consumers and taxpayers to producers. The 
objectives of these programs have evolved around two themes: raising and/or stabilizing 
farm income and preserving the small farm. A partial list of these programs includes price 
and income support, trade restrictions such as import quotas and tariffs, publicly funded 
research, publicly funded irrigation, export subsidies, export credit guarantees, subsidized 
land set-aside and conservation schemes, and subsidized crop insurance. The budgetary 
outlays for most of these programs are authorized by the Congress (and subsequently ap-
proved by the President) every few years through various Acts, commonly known as Farm 
Bills. There have been numerous Acts since the enactment of the first one in 1929, including 
a 1934 Supreme Court decision which declared unconstitutional the main provisions of the 
1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act. 
Historically, the cotton sector in the United States has received proportionally more 
support than most other commodities. Al least 20 Acts since 1929 included provisions that 
affected the cotton market in one way or another. The most important shift in support dur-
ing the last two decades was the 1985 Farm Bill, which replaced public stock-holding man-
agement by a price support mechanism known as deficiency payments. A second impor-
tant change came with the 1996 Farm Bill whereby deficiency payments were replaced by 
decoupled payments. 
Currently, the main channels of support are de-coupled payments (formerly known 
as production flexibility contracts), deficiency payments (through the loan rate mecha-
nism), insurance, subsidies to domestic mills (the so-called Step-2 mechanism also referred 
to as export subsidy), and emergency payments (introduced in 1998 to compensate for the 
loss of income due to low commodity prices but became “permanent” under the 2002 Farm 
Bill).9 Direct payments are predetermined annual payments based on historical enrolled   — 13 —
areas of cotton and were introduced with the 1996 Farm Bill in order to compensate for the 
“losses” due to the elimination of deficiency payments. Market price payments, which 
consist of loan deficiency payments, marketing loan gains, and forfeitures, are designed to 
compensate cotton growers from the difference between the world price and the loan rate 
(i.e. target price) when the latter exceeds the former. Export subsidies, or Step-2 market 
payments, are made to eligible cotton exporters and domestic end users of cotton when 
domestic US prices exceed North Europe c.i.f prices by a certain level and the world price 
is within a certain level of the base loan rate. The objective of the Step-2 payment is to 
bridge the gap between higher US domestic prices and world prices so that US exporters 
and mills maintain their competitiveness. 
According to the International Cotton Advisory Committee, between 1997/98 and 
2002/2003, the direct support to cotton production averaged $1.7 billion (see table 2). That 
figure, however, does not include support through insurance, emergency measures, and 
the step-2 mechanism. When all these measures are taken into consideration, support to 
the US cotton growers is much higher (table 2). During the 1996/97 season—the first year 
of the 1996 Farm Bill—support to US cotton growers amounted $878 million, almost $700 
million from production flexibility contract payments and the rest from insurance subsidy. 
In 1997/98 the support was $1.2 billion. When prices begun declining, the emergency assis-
tance measures were introduced, increasing the support to $1.9 billion in 1998/99, $3.5 bil-
lion in 1999/2000, $2.2 billion in 2000/01 and $3.6 billion during the last season. 
In 2002 the US passed the 2002 Farm Bill, which is expected to be in place for the 
next six years. This Bill retained the earlier support through various Loans, Flexibility Con-
tracts, and Insurance, as well as the Step-2 payment while it legitimized the emergency as-
sistance under the term counter-cyclical payments. If cotton prices remain at their 2001/02 
levels, then US support to its cotton sector is expected to be on the order of $3.5 to $4.0 bil-
lion for the next six years, implying the US cotton producers will be receiving close to 
twice the world market price. 
The European Union 
The origin of cotton intervention in the European Union goes back to the early 1980s when 
Greece and Spain, the two European cotton producers, joined the Union’s Common Agri-
cultural Policy. During the 1960s, there were three cotton producers in Europe: Greece and 
Spain which produced an average of 85,000 tons each and Bulgaria which produced 25,000 
tons. Throughout the 1970s, Bulgaria’s output declined while Greece and Spain managed 
to retain their cotton production at the levels experienced during the 1960s. Cotton pro-
duction by the three countries taken together, experienced an annual decline of 0.4 per an-
num between 1960 and 1982. With the EU’s expansion and the subsequent accession of 
Greece and Spain, cotton production grew by an annual average of 7.3 percent. During the 
1990s, Greece’s and Spain’s cotton output averaged 325,000 and 78,000 tons, respectively 
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Under the Common Agricultural Policy, support is given to cotton growers based 
on the difference between the market price and a guide (i.e. support) price. Advance pay-
ments, which are made to ginners who pass the subsidy to growers in the form of higher 
prices, are on estimates of seed cotton production. The policy also influences the quantity 
of cotton produced by a maximum guaranteed quantity of seed cotton for which assistance 
is provided—782,000 tons of seed cotton for Greece and 249,000 for Spain, approximately 
equivalent to 255,000 and 82,000 tons of cotton lint. 
The European Union reformed its cotton program in 1999 (European Commission 
2000). While the guide price level and the maximum guaranteed quantity of seed cotton 
for which assistance is provided have been maintained, “penalties” (i.e. reduction in sub-
sidy) for excess production over the maximum guaranteed quantity increased. Under the 
reformed policy, for each 1 percent of excess production, the level of subsidy is lowered by 
0.6 percent of the guide price as opposed to 0.5 percent prior to 1999. As production in-
crease, the “penalty” becomes stiffer, effectively, putting an upper limit on the budgetary 
outlays to the cotton sector. It is important to note that this quantitative restriction (the so-
called maximum quantity guaranteed) applies at the aggregate (i.e. country) level imply-
ing that when this restriction is converted to individual basis, it creates not only adminis-
trative complexities but also leads to misallocation of resources. Karagiannis and Pantzios 
(2002) found that the current system failed as a surplus containment mechanism and also 
resulted in farm income losses. 
Between 1995/96 and 1999/2000 the budgetary expenditure on cotton aid ranged be-
tween €740 and €903 million, implying that, on average, EU cotton producers received 
more than twice the A Index—the world price of cotton. Note that even in periods of high 
prices, EU cotton producers receive support since the amount allocated to the cotton sector 
must be disbursed. In addition to output subsidies EU cotton producers receive subsidies 
on inputs such as credit for machinery purchase, insurance, and publicly financed irriga-
tion. 
China 
China is currently the largest producers, consumer, and stockholder of cotton. China’s cot-
ton sector became fully government-controlled in 1953 after the introduction of the first 
Five-Year Plan (Zhong and Fang 2003). The central planning policies adopted then were 
similar to those of the Soviet Union and remained in place for the next 35 years. The cen-
tral government set production targets and procurement quotas. This monopoly was eas-
ily exercised because all ginning facilities were owned by the Cooperatives. A step to boost 
cotton production was taken in 1978 by increasing the price of cotton as well as supplying 
more fertilizer. A second boost came in 1980 with the partial abolition of the communal 
production system under the Household Responsibility System which gave land use rights 
to individual farmers. The Chinese cotton sector consists of primarily smallholders with 
plots ranging between 0.5 and 1 hectares.   — 15 —
Evidence suggests that the government of China protects its cotton sector through 
support prices, import tariffs, export subsidies, and public stockholding. The government 
sets a reference price for cotton, typically above world prices. China also maintains tariffs 
on imports that bridge the gap between domestic and world prices. Following its WTO ac-
cession arrangements the tariffs will be reduced to 15 percent but at the same time a tariff-
related quota system will be implemented to manage imports. 
The International Cotton Advisory Committee found that support to the cotton sec-
tor in the six seasons beginning in 1997/98 ranged from $0.8 to $2.6 billion. Huang, Rozelle, 
and Chang (2003) estimated that during 2001 the nominal rate of protection for cotton av-
eraged 17 percent. Fang and Beghin (2003), however, estimated that between 1997 and 
2000, the nominal protection coefficient for cotton has averaged 0.80, implying that China 
taxes its cotton sector by 20 percent. The different views on the nature and degree of inter-
vention, however, should not be surprising given the complexities of China’s agricultural 
policies as well as the unreliability of the data.10 However, one may conclude that China 
subsidizes its cotton sector as indicated by Jinglin (2003, p. 99): 
In order to assure the interests of the farmers and to promote their stable incomes, China is 
actively exploring the direct subsidy system for the bulk of agricultural products such as 
grain and cotton, and having the existing indirect subsidies adjusted to become direct subsi-
dies and changing the subsidies meant to meant previously for the distribution enterprises to 
the subsidies directly for the farmers. Nevertheless, such subsidy method and standard will 
not surpass the framework of the WTO rules. 
In September 1999, the government of China announced reform measures which in-
cluded: (i) the creation of a cotton exchange to facilitate domestic spot trading; (ii) the re-
duction of prices paid to producers; and (iii) a reduction in stocks. In some sense the re-
forms have worked: China’s stocks declined from 4.1 million tons in 1998/99 to 2.3 million 
tons in 2000/01.11 In September 2001 further reforms were announced and are currently 
under way (Zhong and Fang 2003). First, the internal cotton market would be open to 
cross-regional trade. Second, various enterprises would be allowed to buy cotton directly 
from producers with approval granted by the provincial government. Third, ginning op-
erations would be separated from marketing cooperatives in effect making them commer-
cial enterprises. 
Uzbekistan 
Uzbekistan, the world’s fifth largest cotton producer and second largest cotton exporter, 
produces more than one million tons of lint, most of which is exported. During 1998-99 
cotton exports accounted for one third of total merchandize exports while the sector con-
tributed an average of 6.4 percent to the country’s GDP. Prior to 1991 all aspects of Uz-
bekistan’s cotton sector were under state control (of the Soviet Union). Most cotton was ei-
ther consumed by mills in Russia (then considered domestic trade) or shipped to Eastern 
European countries under barter arrangements. Following the collapse of the Soviet Un-  — 16 —
ion, Uzbekistan begun exporting its cotton to Western countries in exchange of foreign 
currency (until 1996 some cotton still went to Russia in barter trade terms). 
Although 12 years have passed since the change in the trade regime, most aspects of 
production, marketing, and trade of the sector closely resemble pre-1991 arrangements. 
There are numerous entities involved in all post-production activities of cotton. The three 
most important ones are: (i) the state company handling ginning; (ii) the State Trading Or-
ganizations handling exports; and (iii) the Ministry of Foreign and Economic Relations 
handling financial transactions. 
All pre- and post-ginning operations of cotton are handled by UzKhlopkoprom/ 
UzPakhtasanoitish (UKP), a state company which used to be a ministry. UKP is responsi-
ble for collecting, storing, ginning, and classifying cotton, making payments to growers, 
and providing inputs. UKP owns considerable assets, including all ginning and storage fa-
cilities as well as handling machinery and equipment. 
The second important entities are the three state trading organizations (STOs) in 
charge of handling all aspects of cotton exports. The main responsibilities of these organi-
zations include contracting cotton merchants for the sale of cotton, organizing the avail-
ability and shipment of cotton, receiving payments and converting them into local cur-
rency, and paying UKP. Although these organizations have a number of other responsi-
bilities (e.g. purchasing machinery and equipment on behalf of the government) exporting 
cotton is their core activity. Because each organization has been allocated a quota of cotton 
to be exported, there is no competition involved in the export process. 
The third important entity is the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations which re-
ports directly to the government. Its main function is to manage cotton export operations, 
including setting prices, selecting buyers, and monitoring dollar receipts. There are a 
number of other entities involved in the sector such as the state company responsible for 
domestic and international transportation of cotton, the organization responsible for qual-
ity monitoring, and the customs. 
It appears that cotton growers are heavily taxed both directly through the lower 
price received by UKP (which, in turn, receives a fixed price by the STOs, as dictated by 
the Ministry) and indirectly through the exchange rate regime. A recent study found that 
at an ex-ginnery price of $1.03/kg, the STOs receive the equivalent of $0.63/kg (these calcu-
lations were based on an A Index of $1.24/kg). With respect to the difference between $1.03 
and $0.63/kg, the study concluded: “It is not clear exactly where this profitability figure is 
allocated. It is alleged that, after a marketing fee is deducted, the balance is paid to the 
Ministry of Finance as an export duty.” The declared price to be paid to farmers by UKC is 
126,000 Cym/ton of seed cotton, which, at an exchange rate of 960 Cym/$ and 32 percent 
ginning out-turn ratio implies a price of $0.41/kg, about one third of the A Index. 
Perhaps, it is not unreasonable to conclude that, apart from the fact that cotton ex-
ports from Uzbekistan moved from a barter to a commercially oriented structure, the sec-
tor is still tightly controlled by the government. Moreover, growers are taxed heavily, re-  — 17 —
ceiving only about one third of the export price of cotton. 
PREFERENTIAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE COTTON MARKET 
Unlike the markets for commodities such as cocoa, coffee, and rubber, there has been no 
United Nations-backed international price stabilization scheme or stockholding mecha-
nism in the cotton market. The cotton market, however, may be indirectly affected by two 
arrangements: the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing and the US African Growth and 
Opportunity. 
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
The Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) was an agreement among developed country import-
ers and developing country exporters of textiles and apparel to regulate and restrict the 
flow of trade of textiles. Negotiated in 1973 under the auspices of General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the MFA replaced a number of bilateral textile agreements as a 
temporary exception to the rules that otherwise would apply. The MFA (and its predeces-
sor agreements) influence the location of the textile industry thus increasing the costs of 
textile products—in addition to other welfare implications. 
In 1995, the MFA was replaced by the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). 
Under the ATC, import quotas in textiles will come to an end by January 1, 2005 and im-
porting countries will no longer be able to discriminate between exporters. Their elimina-
tion is expected to encourage the relocation of textile processing facilities from developed 
to low cost (mostly developing) countries, reduce the cost of producing textiles, increase 
cotton demand, and consequently raise cotton prices. 
The African Growth and Opportunity Act 
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) provides African countries with the 
most liberal access to the US market available to any country with which the United States 
does not have a free trade agreement and covers the 8-year period from October 01, 2000 
to September 30, 2008.12 One condition is that these countries must have undertaken sub-
stantial policy reforms. The Act, which was part of the US Trade Development Act of 2000, 
was signed by President Clinton on May 18, 2000 while President Bush signed amend-
ments—known as AGOA II—into law on August 6, 2002, expanding the preferential ac-
cess for imports from the eligible countries. 
Although AGOA sets stringent conditions, it offers potentially vast benefits for 
qualifying African countries because it includes a broad list of commodities. However, one 
should note that AGOA is a two-part Act: one applying to non-textile/clothing sectors and 
one applying to the textile/clothing sectors. The conditions for the latter are much more 
stringent than the conditions for the former (AGOA 2002). Specifically: 
The Act provides for duty-free and quota-free access to the U.S. market without limits for   — 18 —
apparel made in eligible Sub-Saharan African countries from U.S. fabric, yarn, and thread. 
It also provides for substantial growth of duty-free and quota-free apparel imports made from 
fabric produced in beneficiary countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Under AGOA I, apparel 
imports made with regional (African) fabric and yarn are subject to a cap of 1.5% of overall 
U.S. apparel imports, growing to 3.5% of overall imports over an 8 year period. AGOA II 
doubles the applicable percentages of the cap. 
Beneficiary countries for apparel exports must establish an effective visa systems to 
ensure compliance with rules of origin, specifically to prevent illegal transshipment and 
use of counterfeit documentation, and show that they have instituted required enforce-
ment and verification procedures. 
Currently, the average duty to garment imports into the US is 17.5 percent. Under 
AGOA, apparel imports into the US from the 14 eligible African countries will be duty free 
subject to an upper limit of 3 percent of total US apparel imports. Since total trade in cloth-
ing from Africa to the US is very small, the 3 percent cap (to increase to 7 percent by year 
7) is unlikely to become a binding constraint. Another beneficial provision is that for coun-
tries with Less Developed status, there is a 4-year exception to the rule of origin (it expires 
in 2004). For example under this provision Tanzania can import yarn from China and ex-
port cloth to the US. 
IMPACT OF DISTORTIONS AND PROSPECTS OF REFORMS 
Impact of Distortions 
On the textile side, Martin (1996) estimated that the MFA imposes an implicit tax of about 
20 percent on cotton products relative to synthetic fiber products. A more recent study by 
Quirke (2002) simulated the impacts of full implementation of ATC and found that the 
world price of cotton will increase by 4 percent (the equivalent of 4 cents/kg at 2001 world 
cotton prices), if the ATC is phased out as planned. 
On the cotton side, the International Cotton Advisory Committee concluded that in 
the absence of direct subsidies, average cotton prices during the 2000/01 and 2001/02 sea-
sons would have been 17 and 31 cents/pound higher. If the US alone removed its subsidies 
during these two seasons, world cotton prices would have been 6 and 11 cents higher, re-
spectively. These figures imply cotton prices 30 and 71 percent higher than the actual av-
erages of 57.2 and 41.8 cents/pound. The study, which is based on a short run partial equi-
librium analysis, does acknowledge that while removal of subsidies would result in lower 
production in the countries which receive them (and hence higher prices in the short 
term), such impact would be partially offset by shifting production to non-subsidizing 
countries in the medium to longer terms; similarly higher prices are likely reduce the 
growth of cotton consumption making the long-run impact less striking. 
Quirke (2002) estimated that removal of production and export subsidies by the US 
and the EU are likely to induce a 20 percent reduction in US cotton production, 50 percent   — 19 —
reduction in US cotton exports, with much higher figures for the EU. He also estimated 
that if support was not in place, world cotton prices would be 10.7 percent higher com-
pared to their 2001/02 levels. Note that both the ICAC analysis and Quirke (2002) used the 
production and export support levels reported by ICAC (see Appendix F, table F11 for 
data details). 
Based on a partial equilibrium model, Tokarick (2003) found that multilateral trade 
liberalization in all agricultural markets (including cotton) is expected to induce a 2.8 per-
cent increase in the world prices of cotton, with 0.8 percent coming from the removal of 
market price support and the remaining 2 percent coming from the removal of production 
subsidies (removal of market price support most likely applies to the US Step-2 payment). 
Tokarick also calculated that global reforms will lead to $95 million in total change in wel-
fare per annum. 
FAPRI (2002) found that under global liberalization (i.e., removal of trade barriers 
and domestic support of all commodity sectors), the world cotton price would increase 
over the baseline scenario by an average of 12.7 percent over the 10-year period (see table 
3). The largest gains in trade go to Africa which would increase its exports by an average 
of 12.6 percent. Exports from Uzbekistan and Australia increase by 6.0 and 2.7 percent, re-
spectively while exports from the United States decline by 3.5 percent. The most dramatic 
impact is on the production side where the European Union’s cotton output would decline 
by more than 70 percent. The latter outcome should be a complete surprise considering 
that the European Union’s cotton output during the late 1990s was, on average, three times 
as much as it was before CAP took effect on the cotton sector. 
Prospects of Reforms by Major Producers 
Prospects for policy reforms by major producers subsidizing the sector are mixed. Support 
for cotton in the European Union is likely to remain at current levels. It is unlikely to in-
crease for two reasons. First the countries expected to join the Union are not cotton pro-
ducers and hence there will be no budgetary pressure. Second, the current support scheme 
is, effectively, subject to an upper limit which appears to be a binding constraint as both 
Greece and Spain, being among the world’s highest-cost cotton producers, are unlikely to 
increase production given the reduced support they would receive if they exceed the cur-
rent output levels. On the other hand, support is not expected to be eliminated because it 
supposedly goes to low income areas and hence it is regarded as a poverty reduction pro-
gram. The nature of support, however, may change by shifting away from direct price 
support towards partially decoupled payments according to a recent EU proposal (see box 
1). The conditions of success and implications of the shift to decoupled support are dis-
cussed in the last section of this paper. 
The US took a step in the right direction with the replacement of the deficient pay-
ment system by decoupled payments in 1996 but all progress was eliminated with the 2002 
Farm Bill which effectively: (i) legitimized emergency payments introduced in 1998/99 fol-  — 20 —
lowing the sharp decline in prices; (ii) renamed them to counter-cyclical payments; (iii) in-
creased target prices; and (iv) made it more convenient for larger farmers to increase the 
support they receive. Historically, US farm bills either give what they promise or give 
more than what they promise (as the recent experience showed). Hence, if history is any 
guide, it is reasonable to expect that US cotton farmers will be receiving generous support 
for the next 6 years, unless the support exceeds WTO commitments. 
However, a number of factors may induce some early reforms. First, the substantial 
increase of the support to the US cotton sector along with 30-year record low prices and 
the fact that 10 percent of US cotton growers receive 90 percent of the support (hence falsi-
fying the claim that support preserve the small farm), is likely to put pressure for altering 
the nature of policy sooner. Second, Brazil’s request for consultations at the WTO regard-
ing US cotton subsidies may create some pressure to lower subsidies (WTO 2002). Third, 
four West African cotton producing countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali) 
pressed for removal of support to cotton sector through the WTO. In an unusual move, the 
President of Burkina Faso addressed the WTO on June 10, 2003, asking for financial com-
pensation for cotton producing low income countries to offset the injury caused by sup-
port. This compensation, according to the request, should be in place for as long as subsi-
dies are in place. 
China appears to be the most promising case of reform. The reforms undertake in 
1999 and more recently in 2001 indicate that its cotton sector will be soon exposed to inter-
nal and external competition. China is also in the process of establishing a cotton futures 
exchange, indicating that market forces within the sector are likely to play a more signifi-
cant role in the future (Shuhua 2003). 
On the international side, while the phase-out of the ATC is supposed to end the 
distortions imposed on the location of the textile industries, it is uncertain whether the ex-
pected benefits will be fully realized. First, ATC is back-loaded with most of the reforms 
expected to take place in the last year, thus increasing the risk of non-compliance. Second, 
a number of (mainly EU) countries have repeatedly sought to impose antidumping duties 
on textile imports from Asia in recent years. Third, there are a number of provisions under 
the ATC which allow for the imposition of temporary duties in the case that the currently 
domestic textiles suffer “significant damage” following the phase out. 
REFORM INITIATIVES IN AFRICA 
During the 1990s, a number of African cotton producing countries undertook substantial 
reforms. The reform process and its outcome have been studied extensively. See, for ex-
ample, Kähkönen and Leathers (1997) for Zambia and Tanzania; Sabune (1996) and Lund-
bæk (2002) for Uganda; Larsen (2002) for Zimbabwe; Baffes (2002) for Uganda, Zimbabwe 
and Tanzania; Baffes (2000), Badiane et al. (2002), and Goreux and Macrae (2003) for Fran-
cophone Africa; Baffes (2002) and Gibbon (1998) for Tanzania. Poulton et al. (2003) looked 
at the cotton sectors of six African countries while Shepherd and Farolfi (1999) reviewed   — 21 —
export commodity sectors for a number of sub-Saharan African countries. The remainder 
of this section draws mainly from these studies and summarizes the reform experiences in 
the cotton sectors of Uganda, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, as well as the efforts currently under 
way in Francophone Africa. 
Uganda 
Cotton was introduced to Uganda early in the 20th century, and production grew rapidly 
until the mid-1930s, when coffee began to compete as an alternative cash crop. Cotton 
production continued to increase steadily, peaking during the early 1970 at 75,000 tons, 
making it the third largest African cotton producer after Sudan and Egypt. Most activities 
in the cotton industry were administered under monopolistic arrangements. The Ministry 
of Agriculture had responsibility for cotton research and seed multiplication. Responsibil-
ity for cotton seed for planting and oil milling fell to the Lint Marketing Board (a state en-
terprise), which was also responsible for lint marketing (both domestic and export) and for 
regulating the industry. Primary marketing and processing were the responsibility of co-
operatives, which had their own society networks and ginning operations. 
The political instability, poor governance, and inappropriate macroeconomic poli-
cies of the 1970s and 1980s had a devastating effect on the Ugandan economy and hit the 
cotton sector especially hard. Cotton production collapsed, plunging to a low of 2,000 tons 
in 1987. Seed multiplication activities were disrupted, as were research and extension. Co-
operatives failed to pay farmers cash for their cotton, and inefficient ginning marketing 
and operations generated high overhead costs. 
In 1992, with World Bank assistance, Uganda embarked on a major reform program 
that included the liberalization of the cotton industry (World Bank 1994). The government 
redefined its role in the cotton industry taking on some new responsibilities (especially 
during the transitional phase) and shedding others. Ginning and the marketing of cotton 
and cotton inputs were liberalized, and research, seed multiplication, and extension ser-
vices were strengthened. 
At the time of the reforms the cooperatives were crippled by bad debt. Potential 
ginning capacity was much greater than actual capacity, and run-down ginneries needed 
infusions of new capital. Management knew little about how to restructure their facilities, 
however. To address the problems, the government established the Business Advisory 
Service, a temporary agency that worked with cooperatives to draw up new business 
plans. In return for restructuring their businesses, the ginneries would receive limited debt 
relief. Temporary lines of credit were established through the Bank of Uganda’s Develop-
ment Finance Department to provide working capital for the restructured firms. Some co-
operatives were able to sell assets and finance smaller, more efficient business. Others en-
tered into joint ventures with foreign partners. 
Government participation in the cotton sector after the reforms takes place almost 
entirely through the Cotton Development Organization. The Cotton Organization repre-  — 22 —
sents the cotton industry as a whole and to monitor the production and marketing of cot-
ton. A 12-member board of directors which includes public and private sector representa-
tives governs the organization. Among other things the board approves expenditures, sen-
ior staff appointments, procurement procedures, and business plans. An auditor-general 
reviews the Organizations’ accounts and by law must report the findings to the legislature. 
To carry out its mandate, the Cotton Organization can charge for its services, bor-
row, manage property, and levy a cess (local tax). The initiating statute also placed explicit 
limits on the Organization’s authority, however. The agency cannot levy a cess of more 
than 2 percent, although the Ministry of Agriculture, which is responsible for the Organi-
zation, can vary or rescind the cess by statutory instrument. The types of penalties the Or-
ganization can levy for noncompliance are limited. Further, it is obliged to give all new en-
trants registration permits, even if they have not previously been engaged in the cotton in-
dustry. Businesses can renew their registrations automatically by paying the fees. 
In many respects the cotton reforms in Uganda have been successful. During the 
eight-year period staring in 1995/96 cotton output in Uganda has averaged 17,000 tons, an 
almost three-fold increase compared to the eight seasons prior to 1995/96. The correspond-
ing A Index average for before and after 1995/96 was $1.56 and $1.40 per kilogram. The 
farmers’ share in world prices rose from less than 50 percent to 70 percent after the re-
forms while a number of new traders and exporters entered the sector. This success came 
despite the failure of most credit mechanisms that have been launched after the reforms. 
Zimbabwe 
Commercial production of cotton in Zimbabwe started in the early 1920s while a compre-
hensive cotton research program along with a research station was set up in 1925. Ad-
vanced technology through insect control and the development of improved seed varieties 
increased production turning Zimbabwe into an important cotton producer in Africa. Ini-
tially, cotton marketing was the responsibility of a committee under the Grain Marketing 
Board. The Cotton Marketing Board was established in 1969 and handled cotton market-
ing. 
The Board controlled most aspects of cotton production until 1994, from the sale of 
planting seeds to the purchase of cotton from farmers. Ginning and the marketing of cot-
ton and cotton seed fell under its purview. The Board had eight ginneries and was the sole 
buyer of cotton (the country’s single private ginnery had to buy cotton from the Board on 
contract). The Board also regulated the industry. It announced producer prices well in ad-
vance, so that the state absorbed all of the price risk. 
The Cotton Board grew into an inefficient organization with poor governance and 
high operating costs. It developed financial difficulties because of weak management and 
subsidized cotton sales—often at half the international price—to the domestic textile in-
dustry. Cotton production fell by almost half during the 1980s. Producers were not paid on 
time and often did not receive full payments. By the late 1980s it had become clear that the   — 23 —
board would have to be restructured or the cotton industry would collapse. A severe 
drought in 1991–92 contributed to the sector’s woes, causing a further 60 percent decline in 
production. 
Zimbabwe appointed private sector representatives to the Cotton Board in 1992, 
leaving just one government representative. The Board’s mandate at the time was to de-
velop a privatization plan for all aspects of cotton trade and marketing. Various regulatory 
controls (such as seed quality regulations and cotton grading) were transferred from the 
Board to the Ministry of Agriculture. In 1993 the government announced that the cotton 
market would be open to new entrants, bringing the Cotton Board’s monopoly to an end. 
In 1994 all subsidies to the textile industry were discontinued. 
In July 1994 the Cotton Board began having difficulty paying for cotton, and a 
number of commercial growers started to buy their seed cotton and have it ginned at the 
only private gin. In September 1994 the Board’s monopoly was formally terminated, and it 
became the Cotton Company of Zimbabwe, with the government holding all shares. The 
government assumed all of the Cotton Company’s debts, allowing the agency to start out 
with a clean balance sheet, and discontinued all subsidies to the textile industry. 
Private companies have moved into ginning and marketing in the country. As of 
1994 the Cotton Company still owned 80 percent of the ginning capacity in Zimbabwe and 
operated a network of buying centers and collection points throughout the major cotton-
growing areas. The Commercial Cotton Growers Association, a cooperative owned by 
growers who farm 25 hectares or more, joined with an international cotton company to 
form a new firm, Cotpro, that provides competition for the Cotton Company 
In 1995 the Cotton Company leased two of its gins to Cargill, a U.S.-based agribusi-
ness. Cargill started buying seed cotton, putting itself in direct competition with the Cot-
ton Company and Cotpro. In 1996 it bought the two gins it had been leasing from the Cot-
ton Company. In October 1997 the Cotton Company was privatized. The government 
holds 25 percent of the shares, small-scale farmers 20 percent, institutional investors and 
the general public 15 percent each, large-scale farmers and the National Investment Trust 
10 percent each, and employees 5 percent. 
Following reforms the cotton industry improved in several ways. First, cotton pro-
duction is up substantially. During the eight seasons since 1995/96, cotton output has av-
eraged 115,000 tons, 50 percent higher than the eight-period average prior to 1995/96. 
Some 30 percent of the 1997/98 cotton harvest was marketed entirely by private entities. 
Private companies now transport most cotton. Competition has pushed the price farmers 
receive to close to 80 percent of international prices, and producers are being paid faster. 
Zimbabwe has also retained its premium it used to receive in the world market. 
Despite its success, the cotton sector of Zimbabwe is currently going through major 
difficulties which are beyond the sector’s control. Political and macroeconomic instability, 
and uncertainty over land issues has reduced substantially investment in the sector. The 
sector is also suffering from implicit taxation through inflation and exchange rate mis-  — 24 —
alignment. During 2002, for example, the official exchange rate was fixed at Z$45 per US$. 
However, unofficial reports indicated that it was traded as high as Z$400 in the parallel 
market. 
Tanzania 
Cotton was introduced to Tanzania around 1904 by German settlers as a plantation crop, 
but the attempt failed. During the 1920s new efforts focused on smallholder production, 
first in Eastern and later in Western Tanzania. Local research during the 1930s led to the 
development of a local pest-resistant variety. Cotton output, especially in Western Tanza-
nia, rose considerably with the releases of these local varieties, along with better organiza-
tion of the sector following establishment of the Tanganyika Lint and Seed Marketing 
Board in 1956. By 1966 Tanzania’s cotton output was 80,000 tons, or 0.75 percent of world 
production of 10.7 million tons. 
A turning point came in the 1960s following the spread of the cooperative move-
ment and deterioration of relations between ginnery owners (mostly Asians) and cotton 
growers. Several hundred primary societies had sprung up, and the groups began han-
dling crop purchasing. Soon, they formed cooperative unions and began building ginner-
ies, training staff, and taking over ginneries and cotton oil mills from foreign owners. In an 
attempt to correct the inefficiencies and poor management, the government abolished the 
unions in 1976 and turned over cotton marketing to the Tanzanian Cotton Authority, the 
successor of the Lint and Seed Marketing Board. The government set the prices paid to 
farmers, establishing uniform national prices for an entire season. This marketing structure 
also failed, and the cooperative unions were reinstated between 1980 and 1984. The unions 
and primary societies acted as agents for the Tanzanian Cotton Marketing Board, the re-
named Tanzania Cotton Authority. The primary societies stored and sold cotton to the co-
operative unions for a fixed price, and the unions processed the seed cotton for a fixed 
margin. The Cotton Board managed domestic and international sales. Because the coop-
erative unions were semipublic entities, they simply added another bureaucratic layer 
rather than making a substantial contribution to value added. Most of the unions accumu-
lated huge debts and managed to survive only through government subsidies and donor 
support. 
The first steps toward cotton reform in Tanzania were taken in 1989/90, when the 
government launched the Agricultural Adjustment Program. The program transferred 
ownership of seed cotton from the Cotton Board to the cooperative unions, and the board 
was converted into a fee-based marketing service for final sales and input purchases. Price 
controls on cotton were gradually relaxed. In 1991/92 the government announced only in-
dicative prices, not fixed prices. The cooperative unions were free to determine their own 
producer prices for the next season, although they chose to offer uniform prices through-
out the country. 
The largest reforms came with the Cotton Act of 1994, when the government for-  — 25 —
mally eliminated the monopoly held by the board and the cooperative unions and allowed 
competition in cotton marketing and ginning. At the time there were 14 regional coopera-
tive unions licensed to trade cotton. In 1994/95 some 22 private companies started trading 
cotton, and 8 new private ginneries were constructed. That opened up another marketing 
channel, especially in Western Tanzania. In Eastern Tanzania, where production was low 
and some farmers had no buyers, the Tanzanian Cotton Lint and Seed Board (the new 
name of the Tanzania Cotton Marketing Board as of 1995) acted as buyer of last resort. 
By 1996/97 private businesses were purchasing almost half of all cotton. Private 
traders and ginneries were able to capture a considerable share of the market because they 
offered higher prices than cooperative unions and paid promptly. Some private ginneries 
also engaged in contract farming, providing inputs (seeds and occasionally fertilizer) to 
producers who agreed to supply cotton in return. The ginneries and producers usually es-
tablished a minimum price at planting time, but the price could be adjusted if the market 
price was higher during the harvest. 
The outcome of cotton reforms in Tanzania has been mixed. On the positive side, 
the share of producer prices increased to 51 percent (from 41 percent prior to the reforms). 
Furthermore, growers farmers receive payments quickly, a major achievement compared 
to 6-month delays encountered prior to the reforms. And, contrary to what many reports 
show, quality of cotton appears not to have suffered considerably. On the other hand, cot-
ton production after 1995/96 has averaged less than before reforms (55,000 and 61,000 tons, 
respectively). On the policy side, the Cotton Board along with the two line Ministries (Ag-
riculture and Food Security as well as Cooperatives) still play a major role in the sector 
which goes far beyond the regulatory role they are supposed to play. Collection and dis-
semination of data (as well as accuracy of statistics) are poor even by the government’s 
own admission. 
Francophone Africa 
The modern cotton industry in West African countries was pioneered by the French state-
owned Compagnie Française de Développement des Fibres Textiles (CFDT). As countries 
gained independence they established their own national cotton companies, but the CFDT 
retained a minority shareholding position (usually holding around one-third of shares) in 
these companies and entered into technical agreements with them. It also retained an 
ownership interest in companies engaged in processing cotton by-products. The national 
cotton companies have a legal monopsony in seed cotton, and most have a monopoly in 
ginning, marketing, and providing inputs to farmers. They announce a base buying price 
for seed cotton before planting starts, sometimes supplementing this price with a second 
payment. Any supplement is based on the company’s financial results for the season and 
is paid on production the following season. Village producer associations handle interme-
diate input credit and seed payments, and input credits are deducted from payments for 
cotton.   — 26 —
Aided by research in Africa and France, cotton growing expanded rapidly in West 
Africa, increasing more than fourfold in the past 25 years. During the 1999/ 2000 season, 
West and Central African countries produced 930,000 tons, or 5 percent of world produc-
tion. The region is the third-largest cotton exporter after the United States and Uzbekistan, 
accounting for almost 15 percent of world exports. Farmers use chemical inputs and seed 
varieties well adapted to local conditions to produce high yields and consistent quality 
cotton. The industry is bolstered by high repayment rates for input credits and well-
organized producer associations. 
The system has a number of weaknesses, however. The prices West African pro-
ducers receive tend to be very low. For example, farmers in Zimbabwe and India received, 
respectively, 37 and 60 percent more for similar types of cotton from 1983 until 1995. Since 
1994 (when the CFA franc devaluation took place), prices in Zimbabwe and India have 
been 80 percent to 100 percent higher than prices in West Africa. The services the cotton 
companies provide (extension services, rural road maintenance, and transportation to 
move seed cotton to gins) are only partially responsible for the price differences. A large 
part of the gap between domestic and export prices of cotton has been absorbed by gov-
ernments in the form of various taxes (export taxes, taxes on parastatal profits, etc.) This 
money has, in part, been used to subsidize other groups, especially domestic textile firms 
through low prices charged for cotton, and low prices for cotton seed supplied to the do-
mestic oil and meal companies. The absence of any competition in domestic markets has 
often allowed costly operating inefficiencies on the part of the parastatal companies, espe-
cially in the export marketing of lint. More generally, the system creates opportunities for 
rent seeking and corruption, generally at the cost of farmers and the economy. 
The determination of annual cotton prices reflects the relative bargaining power of 
a number of groups; namely, producers, governments, managers of the state-owned cotton 
companies, the CFDT, and in some cases private ginning firms. Pan-territorial pricing of 
cotton and farm inputs means that transport costs are not properly taken into account in 
the determination of where cotton is grown. Furthermore, the uniformity of cotton input 
and output prices across entire countries, effectively transfers resources from producers 
who are close to ginning or distribution centers to those who are further away. Farmers 
have limited autonomy as regards decisions on the types and quantities of the seeds and 
other inputs they use. Pan-seasonal pricing of seed cotton and planned delivery schedules 
to ginning plants severely limit farmers’ choices on holding seed cotton inventories. The 
system also restricts the use of seed cotton as collateral to borrowing for cotton inputs 
only, which underutilizes the potential of cotton production to support rural credit flows. 
Finally, the system does not respond flexibly to changes in world market conditions. For 
example, in the late 1980s and early 1990s low world prices and an overvalued currency 
led to the de facto bankruptcy of a number of state cotton companies. The companies had to 
be drastically restructured, supported by injections of money from national governments 
and international aid organizations.   — 27 —
During the past several years, in conjunction with the AFD (Agence Française de 
Développement), the World Bank has held intensive discussions with the governments 
and other stakeholders in West and Central Africa, including the cotton parastatals, CFDT, 
and input suppliers. These discussions resulted in two broad proposals: retaining the cot-
ton companies but reforming and regulating them, and introducing free entry and compe-
tition. 
The first proposal involved a number of steps including: 
  setting prices at levels appropriate to a competitive environment; 
  giving producers equity in the national cotton companies and more influence over 
key decisions, especially price setting; 
  subcontracting activities such as providing inputs and transportation to private 
firms; and 
  eliminating subsidies on sales of cotton lint and cotton seed to domestic textile firms 
and oil mills. 
The advantage of this proposal is that it reduces the risk of damaging the current 
system—which has many desirable aspects—with more far-reaching reforms. Maintaining 
the current system’s ability to recover research and extension costs and its high repayment 
rates on input loans is especially important. The proposal has two weaknesses, however. 
First, domestic prices are unlikely to move in line with world prices (a supposed goal of 
the reform process), because large shares of national income are at stake. The price-setting 
mechanism has been (and is likely to remain) political because a number of interest groups 
are involved in the negotiations. Second, the proposal is incompatible with initiatives to 
establish free trade among countries in the region under the two regional arrangements, 
(Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine, UEMOA and Communauté Economi-
que et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale, CEMAC). New trade arrangements would require 
reforming the cotton industry again. 
The second proposal, which involves free entry calls for: 
  opening the sector to competitive entry at all levels and hence linking domestic 
prices to international prices which would vary according to transportation costs 
and the season; 
  maintaining and strengthening research, extension, and phytosanitary regulations 
where the government has an essential role; 
  strengthening farmer groups and facilitating their participation in voluntary contract 
farming arrangements; 
  freeing the cotton industry from sector-specific taxation and subjecting it only to 
economy wide taxes; and 
  increasing the efficiency of regional ginneries by harmonizing reforms of cotton 
trade across West African cotton zones.   — 28 —
In some countries free entry may be all that is needed to generate a competitive system. In 
other countries privatization of the national cotton companies and subsequent restructur-
ing into a number of successor companies may be necessary. Such a move would signal 
the government’s commitment to open markets and ensure that producers in every region 
have access to competitive markets for their seed cotton. 
The World Bank has argued that the discipline and responsibility that a free-entry 
competitive system imposes on market participants would make for a more resilient, flexi-
ble, self-reliant, and more innovative national cotton sector. Improved competition 
through market reforms offers important opportunities for regional trade and cooperation, 
the latter in areas such as research, phytosanitary regulations, and seed development and 
certification. Most importantly, improved sector performance would contribute to alleviat-
ing poverty by raising cotton prices to levels enjoyed by farmers elsewhere in the world. 
Significant developments have taken place during the last few years, which indicate 
the future direction of institutional changes in the region’s cotton sector. Three producing 
countries, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo, have now opened their sector to private ginners. 
Benin and Côte d’Ivoire, with a combined production of about 290,000 tons in the 
1999/2000 season, have eliminated the monopoly power of their national companies and 
transferred key responsibilities to the private sector.   — 29 —
PART III:  THE ISSUES 
SYNTHESIS OF ISSUES AND STYLIZED FACTS 
A number of market- and policy-related issues and stylized facts emerge from the preced-
ing analysis. 
  Cotton is very important to a number of low income African and Central Asian 
countries, in some cases contributing as much as 40 percent to merchandize exports 
and between 5 and 10 percent to GDP. Considering that in most countries cotton is a 
smallholder crop, the implications of price changes (either induced by market forces 
or policy interventions) as well as changes in market share are enormous. For exam-
ple, a 40 percent reduction in price (i.e. equivalent to the price decline that took place 
from December 2000 to May 2002) implies a 7 percent reduction in rural income in 
Benin—a typical cotton producing country in West Africa. 
  Cotton faces intense competition from chemical fibers, especially following techno-
logical improvements of the early 1970s which brought their prices down to cotton 
price levels. Since 1975, polyester and cotton have been traded at roughly the same 
price levels. Currently, the share of cotton in total fiber consumption is 40 percent 
(down from 68 percent in 1960). 
  Consumption growth of cotton has been the same as population growth during the 
last 40 years, implying that if past trends continue, cotton consumption at the end 
than the current decade will be about 23 million tons (up from the current level of 21 
million tons). 
  Cotton prices, as is the case with most primary commodities, have been declining in 
real terms. Price variability during the post-1985 period has been 2.5 times higher of 
what it was during the pre-1973 period and it is about half of what it was during 
1973-84. 
  Minimal border restrictions but considerable domestic support. Major subsidizers 
are the United States, $3.7 billion in 2001/02 and the European Union—Greece and 
Spain—$0.7 billion (compare this to $20 billion, the value of world's cotton produc-
tion, evaluated at 2001 prices and quantities). This level of support implies that 
prices received by US and EU cotton producers are 87 and 160 percent above world 
prices. China has been reportedly supporting its cotton sector during the last few 
seasons by an estimated $1.5 billion annually, but this figure cannot be substantiated 
due to the complexity of Chinese policies and the quality of data (this does not nec-
essarily imply that China does not support its cotton sector). 
  Many cotton producing countries have reacted by introducing offsetting support. 
Support in Turkey, Brazil, Mexico, Egypt, and India, totaled $0.6 billion during 
2001/02. 
  Domestic support by major producers has triggered some noteworthy reactions. 
Brazil initiated a WTO consultation process claiming losses to its cotton exports due   — 30 —
to subsidies by the United States. More recently, four West African cotton producing 
countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali) pressed for removal of support to 
cotton sector through the WTO. In an unusual move, the President of Burkina Faso 
addressed the WTO on June 10, 2003, asking for financial compensation for cotton 
producing low income countries to offset the injury caused by support. This com-
pensation, according to the request, should be in place for as long as subsidies are in 
place. 
  The cotton sector has found an unlikely ally. The Director General of the Interna-
tional Rayon and Synthetic Fibres Committee in a letter to the Financial Times on June 
12, 2003 complained that “recent increases in cotton subsidies have rigged the mar-
ket even more dramatically in favor of cotton, depressing demand for every substi-
tute product. The result is industrial plants being kept idle… that were built in le-
gitimate expectation that the competitive advantages of manufactured fibers would 
create demand to fill the capacity…” 
  If support is completely removed (including full implementation of the Agreement 
on Textiles and Clothing), cotton prices would be at least 15 percent higher than they 
would have been in the absence of reforms. 
  The prospects for eliminating support by major producers are slim at best. The 
United States introduced the 2002 Farm Bill, which is expected to be in place for the 
next 6 years—historically Farm Bills have given more than what they promise, not 
less. The European Union reformed its cotton policy in 1999. Its forthcoming expan-
sion does not affect the cotton sector since none of the new entrants is cotton pro-
ducer. A shift from price support to decoupled payments, however, if designed and 
implemented properly, is likely to reduce production by the main supporters and 
consequently boost world prices. 
  A number of East African cotton producers undertook reforms during the 1990s. 
Research has shown that whenever the reform process was completed or there was 
no backtracking supply response took place and growers received higher share of 
f.o.b. prices, both considerable achievements in an environment of declining world 
prices. 
  The World Bank and other institutions have advocated reforms in the cotton sec-
tors of West Africa during the last 6 years and extensive consultations have taken 
place among the relevant stakeholders. The World Bank's position (which has been 
clearly articulated on several occasions) is in favor of competition in the cotton sector 
while retaining the positive elements of the current system, not outright privatiza-
tion. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Given the highly distorted nature of the cotton market and the fact that millions of rural 
poor households in developing countries depend on this commodity, what are the alterna-
tives? On the demand side, cotton promotion is something that must be pursued by all cot-  — 31 —
ton producers. There are two encouraging sings regarding cotton promotion. First, the US 
has an active cotton promotion program with an annual budget of about $60 million. The 
main feature of this program is raising consumers awareness of cotton through the “Seal of 
Cotton” campaign. According to Skelly (2003) there is a strong correlation between the 
program’s advertising campaign and cotton’s market share in the US. 
Second, an initiative was undertaken recently through the International Cotton Ad-
visory Committee to establish an international cotton promotion program. To that end, the 
International Forum for Cotton Promotion (IFCP) was established in 2003. The principal 
objective of the Forum is to encourage and facilitate national market development pro-
grams, organized by associations and commercial organizations in individual countries, 
and funded from domestic resources. The Forum is to achieve this objective by serving as 
a clearinghouse for the exchange of proven ideas and strategies to be implemented by na-
tional organizations, and by facilitating the establishment and expansion of national de-
mand enhancement efforts. While it is too early to assess the performance of the Forum, it 
is certainly a step in the right direction. 
Developing Countries 
As discussed earlier, a number of developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa 
have undertaken policy reforms during the 1990s. Setting aside the lively debate on the 
motives of the reforms, in many respects the reforms have been successful. For example, in 
the few cases reviewed here, cotton growers received higher share of fob prices, they also 
received payments more promptly, and there was considerable supply response. In an en-
vironment of declining commodity prices, these are not trivial achievements. However, in 
a number of cases, the reform process has not been completed (Tanzania), it has been re-
versed (Zimbabwe), it has been slow (West Africa), or it has not even started at all (Uz-
bekistan). In these cases further reforms are the only feasible alternative. 
A second issue that should receive attention is the enabling policy environment re-
garding the use of genetically modified cotton. In China for example, where GM cotton is 
used extensively by small-holders, the costs of producing cotton declined by 20-25 percent. 
This cost reduction meant doubling the net income for cotton growers. One should also 
note that GM cotton has not been subject to negative consumer reaction as has been the 
case with GM food products. 
A third issue (and closely related to GM cotton) is organic cotton. Producers of or-
ganic products typically command significant premia. However, organic cotton produc-
tion has not been as profitable as other organic crops (such as coffee and tea). The main 
reason is weak demand which appears to be a reflection of the “distance” between the 
farm product—cotton—and the final product—cloth. It is because of this distance that GM 
cotton has not faced resistance by the consumers, which further reinforces the conclusion 
that GM cotton is something that developing countries should consider seriously.   — 32 —
Developed Countries 
The price prospects (and consequently the export shares of low cost producers, including 
many African countries) can be improved considerably if support by developed countries 
is reduced substantially or eliminated altogether. However, given the low probability of 
eliminating support, a second best alternative would be for support to be given in a non-
distortionary manner. A type of support with minimal distortionary effects—the so-called 
decoupled support mechanisms—has re-gained popularity recently. Income transfers un-
der decoupled mechanisms are based on past production and prices and thus have no ef-
fect on current production decisions. 
Decoupled support was attempted in the European Union with the Common Agri-
cultural Policy reform of 1992, in Mexico with the PROCAMPO program of 1994, and in 
the United States with the Freedom to Farm Act of 1996. The outcome of these programs 
has not been encouraging. The reason was that these schemes did not include three essen-
tial conditions that would make them successful: (i) substituting all support mechanisms 
with decoupled support; (ii) limiting the duration of the programs which would have 
made them true transition mechanisms and (iii) not requiring that resources remain in ag-
ricultural use which would reduce the overall supply of the commodities under considera-
tion and hence lift world prices (Baffes and Meerman 1998). Unless these conditions are 
met, any attempts to restore the credibility of decoupled support policies and ultimately 
remove support to the cotton (and other) sector(s) are unlikely to have the beneficial im-
pact intended. 
What makes decoupled support in the cotton sector an interesting (and potentially 
applicable) alternative is that almost all support comes in the form of domestic measures. 
Therefore, changing the nature of support does not require changing the sources of fund-
ing as it would in the case of border measures. 
Recently the EU proposed changes in its cotton policy (see Box 1). According to the 
proposal, about €800 million (approximately equal to the current budgetary outlays of the 
cotton program) will be allocated as follows: (i) €420 million on decoupled payments; the 
only requirement for these payments is that producers must have planted cotton during 
1999, 2000, and 2001; (ii) €280 million on area payments (if plantings exceed 425,360 hec-
tares, support per hectare will be reduced proportionately); and (iii) €100 million to be 
spent on rural development measures. Although the proposal is a step in the right direc-
tion, two shortcomings must be highlighted. First, it unties 60 percent of support, not all 
support, which is one of the main shortcomings of current decoupling schemes. Second, 40 
percent of the support is linked to total area, thus not fully removing the incentive to 
overproduce.   — 33 —
NOTES 
 
1  The terms man-made and chemical fibers are used interchangeably in this paper. Often, the lit-
erature refers to man-made or chemical fibers as synthetic fibers, probably a reflection of the fact 
that non-cellulosic fibers are also called synthetic polymers as opposed to cellulosic fibers whish 
are called natural polymers. 
2  The shares in world’s total fiber consumption in 1925 were: cotton, 84.2 percent; wool and flax, 
13.5 percent; silk, 0.7 percent; and rayon, 1.6 percent.  In 1946 they were:  cotton, 72.6 percent; wool 
and flax, 15.4 percent; silk, 0.2 percent; and rayon, 11.8 percent. 
3  The only period when prices increased in a sustained manner was between 1730 (the earliest 
price records) and 1790, 3 years prior to the invention of the ginnery (Baffes 2003). 
4  The validity of these percentage changes depends on the stationarity properties of the variables 
under consideration. In order to highlight the importance of this issue, all growth rates reported in 
this paper have been estimated with OLS and all relevant statistics along with their interpretation 
are reported in Appendix C. 
5  Not all these technological improvements have been shared equally by all cotton producers.  For 
example, mechanical harvesting is being practiced in the United States, EU, Australia, and to some 
extent in Brazil, representing approximately 30 percent of cotton production.  The remaining cot-
ton is hand-picked. 
6  The 1984/85 price decline is considered as a structural break. One may argue, however, that if the 
policy shift in the US, which caused the massive de-stocking, was the main reason behind the price 
decline, a new stock equilibrium level would cause a price increase. What is argued here is that the 
policy shift accelerated the price decline which would have taken place in the long run. Real cotton 
prices did rise later but never reached the pre-1984 levels. 
7  Although GM cotton was first grown in the US, China was the first country to commercially 
produce GM tobacco and tomatoes. 
8  Carl et al. (2001) also found that the increased use of GM cotton in China was associated with 
considerable positive health effects, i.e. fewer hospitalizations from pesticide poisoning. That was 
expected as according to the survey farmers who did not use Bt cotton had to spray, on average 12 
times, while farmers who used Bt cotton had to spray only 3 to 4 times. 
9  The Step-2 mechanism is often referred to as export subsidy. Its objective is to eliminate the dif-
ference between the higher US domestic prices and world prices so the US cotton exporters main-
tain their competitiveness. Because it is a subsidy to millers, whose end product may either be con-
sumed domestically or be exported, the Step-2 payment is equivalent to a production subsidy. 
Ironically, US cotton producers are subsidized in all three conceivable scenarios: (i) when prices 
remain constant (through the production flexibility contracts); (ii) when prices fall (through the 
loan rate and counter-cyclical payments); and (ii) when prices increase (through the Step-2 mecha-
nism.) 
10  Following the September 1999 reforms, the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture in collaboration 
with FAO holds conferences every two years in order for local officials to familiarize themselves   — 34 —
 
and exchange ideas concerning developments in the cotton market. These conferences have be-
come useful venues for information and data dissemination. 
11  Chinese stocks have been subject to lively debate within the cotton industry, because (i) the ac-
curacy of the data is questionable and (ii) the quality of cotton stocks is unknown. 
12  As of May 2002, there were 36 eligible AGOA countries. Cotton producing countries which have 
been declared eligible for apparel provision under AGOA are: Benin, Cameroon, South Africa, 
Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia. Chad, Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria are eligible under AGOA but non-
eligible under the apparel provision. Notable exceptions from AGOA are Angola, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, and Zimbabwe.   — 35 —
Box 1:The 2003 EU Reform Proposal for Cotton 
On September 23, 2003, the EU Commission proposed to reform its cotton, sugar, and tobacco 
sectors. Under the cotton reform proposal, the EU support to the cotton sector will consist of the 
following parts: (i) a single farm payment scheme, (ii) production aid scheme, granted as an 
area payment, and (iii) development measures. The proposed reform is schedules to be effective 
during the 2005 season. The projected annual budgetary expenditure for the new scheme will be 
about €800 million, approximately equal to the current level of budgetary outlays. The first and 
second components of the new program will absorb €700 million, 60 percent of which (€420 mil-
lion) is earmarked for the single payment and 40 percent (€280 million) for the area payment. 
The only requirement for the single farm payment is that recipients must have planted cotton 
during the 1999, 2000, and 2001 seasons, making it a fully decoupled payment. The area-
coupled payment is given in order to prevent production disruption in areas with a high eco-
nomic dependency on cotton. 
The area payment would be given for a maximum area of 425,360 hectares (340,000 ha in 
Greece, 85,000 ha in Spain and 360 ha in Portugal) and would be proportionately reduced if 
payment claims exceed the maximum area of a Member State. It could be differentiated on the 
basis of specific criteria, relating to the participation of producers in an inter-branch organiza-
tion which would be approved by Member States and subject to controls. A maximum of half of 
the area payment to members of an inter-branch organization could be determined according to 
inter-branch scales, rewarding production deliveries in quality and quantity terms. The activi-
ties of each inter-branch organization would be financed by its members and by a Community 
grant of €10 per hectare. That support is expected to be about €4.5 million. The balance with the 
total market expenditure for cotton will be included in a restructuring envelope for cotton areas. 
This last component of the proposal (€100 million) would be shared between Member 
States according to the average area eligible for aid over the reference period and would serve 
an additional financial instrument within the second pillar of the CAP in order to fund rural 
development measures. It may be used either for more beneficiaries, more measures, or even an 
increased aid intensity of existing rural development measures. 
Source: European Commission (2003).   — 36 —
TABLE 1 
COTTON’S IMPORTANCE TO DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION 
ECONOMIES: 1998-99 AVERAGES 
  COTTON EXPORTS 












Burkina Faso  127  43.9  5.1  289  249 
Benin 164  39.1 7.1  419  398 
Uzbekistan 1,038  32.2  6.5  3,227  467 
Chad 76  32.2  4.7  236  224 
Mali 180 29.5  6.7  611  285 
Togo 67  21.3  4.7  315  341 
Tajikistan 97  15.1  8.2  643 352 
Turkmenistan 110  12.3  3.6  891  1,126 
Tanzania 44  7.6  0.5  576  185 
Syria 214  6.7  1.4  3,177  858 
Sudan 41  6.0  0.4  688  290 
a. Constant 1995 US dollars. 
Source. FAO (FAOSTAT) and World Bank (World Development Indicators).   — 37 —
TABLE 2 
GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO US COTTON PRODUCERS, 1996/97-2001/02 
  1996/97 1997/98 1998/99  1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02 
Assistance (million US $)        
Loan  Deficiency  Payments  0.0  6.0 320.7 687.3 151.4 732.1 
Marketing  Loan  Gains  0.0  26.2 239.8 859.8 390.3  1,512.8 
Forfeitures  1.6 0.3 3.3 1.1  17.2 0.1 
Production  Flexibility  Contract 699.3 597.5 637.0 614.0 575.2 473.9 
Market  Loss  Assistance  0.0  0.0 316.2 613.5 612.8 523.6 
Insurance  157.2 147.7 154.9 223.3 215.8 266.4 
Step-2  19.8 466.7 214.4 486.1 252.7 125.1 
Total  877.9 1,244.4 1,886.3 3,485.1 2,215.4 3,634.0 
Production (thousand tons)  4,124 4,303 3,251 3,832 3,742 4,420 
A Index (US$ per kilogram)a  1.73 1.60 1.30 1.16 1.26 0.92 
Assistance  (US$  per  kilogram)  0.21 0.29 0.58 0.91 0.59 0.82 
Assistance  (%  of  the  A  Index)  12% 18% 45% 78% 47% 89% 
a.  August to July average. 
Sources:  United States Department of Agriculture (assistance), International Cotton Advisory Committee 
(production), and author’s calculations the rest.   — 38 —
TABLE 3 
EFFECT OF REMOVAL OF DISTORTIONS (PERCENTAGE CHANGES OVER BASELINE) 
  2003/04 2005/06 2007/08 2009/10 2011/12  Averagea 
World Price  15.6 13.7 13.0 12.2 11.7 12.7 
Exports        
Africa  12.1 15.1 14.0 13.1 12.3 12.6 
Australia  3.9 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.1 2.7 
United  States  -8.4 -6.6 -4.0 -1.5  0.9 -3.5 
Uzbekistan  5.4 6.9 6.7 6.4 6.2 6.0 
World  3.9 5.6 6.2 6.7 7.3 5.8 
Production        
United  States  -18.3 -7.9 -5.9 -4.1 -2.3 -6.7 
European  Union -77.4 -77.7 -78.3 -78.8 -79.0 -70.5 
Uzbekistan  3.1 4.7 4.6 4.4 4.2 4.0 
Africa  4.5 7.5 7.1 6.7 6.3 6.0 
a. Average is taken over the 10-year period 2001/02 to 2010/11. 
Source:  FAPRI (2002).   — 39 —
































ANIMAL ORIGIN  PLANT ORIGIN 
Most common are wool, 
cashmere, and silk. 
CELLULOSIC 
NATURAL MAN-MADE
Most common are cotton, 
linen, sisal, and jute. 
Most common are carbon, 
ceramic, and glass. 
NON-CELLULOSIC
The raw material used to produce cel-
lulosic fibers is wood. Also called 
natural polymers. Viscose (known as 
rayon) is the most common.
Also called synthetic polymers, they 
come from crude oil. Polyester, 
acrylic, and polyamide (known as 
nylon) are the most common.  — 40 —
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PART IV:  THE FACTS 
APPENDIX A:  CONCENTRATION INDICES 
One way to measure the degree of concentration is to use the Herfindahl concentration 
index. This index is defined as the squared sum of, say, export shares of all countries; 
values close to unity indicate that a single country accounts for most exports; values 
close to zero, indicate that a large number of countries have equal export shares. In 
technical terms, let X denote global cotton exports and Xi cotton exports of country i. 
Then concentration of exports, IX, is defined as IX = Σi(Xi/X)2. If IX = 1, a single country 
accounts for all exports. If IX ≈ 0, a large number of countries have equal shares. 
The figures that follow depict the evolution of the concentration of exports and 
imports (figure A1), concentration of production and consumption (figure A2), and 
concentration of stocks (figure A3). During the last 40 years, concentration of cotton im-
ports declined from a high of 8 percent in 1960 to a low of 4 percent during the late 
1990s. Cotton exports have been far more concentrated than imports. Moreover, the 
concentration of cotton exports is more variable than the concentration of imports. The 
spike in the index of cotton exports in the early 1990s is due to Central Asian cotton 
production, which is being recorded as trade after the disintegration of the Soviet Un-
ion. 
Concentration of consumption fluctuated around an average of 9 percent during 
the first 2 decades of the sample and increased thereafter. The peak in the concentration 
of production during the mid-1980s reflects China’s production boom. The first peak in 
the concentration of stocks is due to the US (stockholding policies of the Commodity 
Credit Corporation). The latter two peaks are due to large stocks held by China.   — 45—
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APPENDIX B:  GROWTH RATE ESTIMATION AND UNIT ROOTS 
Typically, the growth rate between two-periods, say ρ, is calculated as: 
ρ = (Qt – Qt-1)/Qt-1,       (1) 
where Qt is the variable of interest. Equation (1) can also be written as Qt = (1+ρ)Qt-1. 
Now let Qt grow at rate ρ in all periods, while in each period it is subjected to stochastic 
shocks ηt. That is, 
Qt = (1+ρ)Qt-1ηt.        ( 2 )  
It is assumed that the error term, ηt, is log-normally distributed with mean to equal 1, 
reflecting the proportionality nature of shocks. 
From (2) it follows that Qt-1 = (1+ρ)Qt-2ηt-1, which upon substitution back to (2) 
gives Qt = (1+ρ)2Qt-2ηtηt-1. Recursive substitution yields: 
Qt = (1+ρ)tQ0ηtηt-1... η1.       ( 3 )  
Taking logarithms in (3) and setting µ = ln(Q0), β = ln(1+ρ), and εt = Σtln(ηt), gives: 
ln(Qt) = µ + βt + εt.        ( 4 )  
β is typically estimated with OLS and the growth rate is calculated as ρ = exp(β)-1. Note 
that for small values of β, ρ ≈ β. 
In order to assess the performance of the model both conventional and stationar-
ity statistics are used. Conventional statistics include t-ratios and the R2 while the sta-
tionarity statistics include the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 
1981). ADF is based on the regression (xt - xt-1) = µ + γxt-1 + lags(xt - xt-1) + υt, where xt de-
notes the series under consideration, the error term of (4) in this case; the lag length is 
selected so that υt is rendered white noise. A negative value of γ significantly different 
from zero indicates that xt is stationary, often denoted as I(0). To identify the presence of 
one unit root we test H0: xt is not I(0) against H1: xt is I(0). Another second test is the Phil-
lips-Perron test (PP). If the unit root hypothesis is rejected (i.e. a high ADF or PP statistic 
in absolute value), which implies that the variable under consideration is stationary, we 
conclude that the growth rate can be summarily expressed by a single point estimate 
(see Baffes and Le Vallèe 2002 for details on estimation). 
All growth rate estimates discussed in this paper have bee estimated as men-
tioned above for the 1960-2002 period and results are reported in Table B1. In four cases 
(real price of cotton, polyester to A Index ratio, world cotton consumption, and cotton 
production in Europe) growth rates have been estimated subject to structural breaks. 
With the exception of world cotton consumption, the respective dates for structural 
breaks reflect events that are believed to have altered the stochastic behavior of the 
variable under consideration. For the real price of cotton it was the change in the US 
support policy in 1985. For the Polyester to A Index ratio the break is in 1972, when 
polyester and cotton prices reached parity. For cotton production in Europe it was the   — 48—
first EU expansion. Because no even is behind the world cotton consumption’s struc-
tural break in 1985 (apart from visual inspection), the growth rate estimate based on the 




GROWTH RATE ESTIMATION RESULTS, ANNUAL DATA, 1960-2002 
Period  µ  β  R2  DW ADF  PP  ρ 










0.26 1.52  -2.51  -3.01*  -1.96 










0.23 1.27  -3.94*** -4.20***  1.03 





0.94 0.11  -2.43  -2.33  4.69 





0.98 0.25  -2.70*  -1.99  3.02 















0.78 0.85  -1.12  -2.09  0.67 





0.01 0.31  -3.04**  -2.34  -0.04 





0.87 0.18  -2.34  -2.19  2.22 





0.87 0.20  -1.95  -2.03  -1.04 
continued   — 49—
TABLE B1 (continued) 
GROWTH RATE ESTIMATION RESULTS, ANNUAL DATA, 1960-2002 
Period  µ  β  R2  DW ADF  PP  ρ 










0.86 1.40  -3.07**  -3.51** 5.39 





0.94 0.88  -2.44  -3.39** 1.77 





0.99 0.08  -2.45  -2.35  3.58 





0.99 0.03  -2.63*  -0.67  1.76 
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses denote t-ratios. DW denotes the Durbin-Watson measure of serial corre-
lation. ADF and PP refer to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron stationarity statistics. ρ de-
notes the annual growth rate. Asterisks denote rejection of non-stationarity at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% 
(***) level of significance. Rejection of non-stationarity implies that the variable under consideration is 
trend stationary and hence the estimated growth rates are valid representations of the true growth rate.   —5 0—
APPENDIX C:  PRICE VARIABILITY 
Calculating price variability is a complicated issue for at least two reasons. First, vari-
ability must be defined around some statistic, typically the first moment of the distribu-
tion. As expected, different statistics around which price variability is defined will yield 
different outcomes. Second, the statistical properties of prices may also pose difficulties 
in calculating variability. Prices are typically non-stationary, implying that as we move 
further away from a certain point, the probability that the price will return to that initial 
point becomes smaller. In technical terms, non-stationarity implies that the first two 
moments of the distribution do not exist. The remaining of this appendix measures cot-
ton price variability and whether it has changed during the past 40 years by taking into 
consideration these two difficulties. 
The most widely used indicator of variability is the standard deviation. It meas-
ures how widely values of a sample are dispersed around its average. It is defined as 
the sum of the square of each deviation from the mean, µ, divided by the number of ob-
servations, n. Let Pt denote the price at time t. Then, the standard deviation, Sn, is 
Sn = [Σt(Pt - µ)2/(n – 1)]1/2      ( 1 )  
If Pt is subject to a linear trend, then (Pt  - µ) is replaced by (Pt  - t) in (1) and becomes: 
Sn = [Σt(Pt - t)2/(n – 1)]1/2      ( 2 )  
These measures however, require that the variable under consideration is either station-
ary (when µ is used) or trend-stationary (when t is used). 
In the case of non-stationarity (the most likely outcome for price series), one has 
to induce stationarity first and then calculate variability. Because non-stationary vari-
ables require taking first differences to induce stationarity, the measure of variability 
used is the Z-statistic. It is defined as: 
Sn = [Σt(Pt – Pt-1)2/(n – 1)]1/2      ( 3 )  
Notice that when Pt is nonstationary (or alternatively I(1)), its first difference, (Pt - Pt-1), 
is stationary, I(0), thus making the Z-statistic a proper measure of price variability. 
Therefore, the first step in calculating price variability is to examine the stationar-
ity properties of Pt. This is done by utilizing the testing procedures outlined in appendix 
B. The sample consists of monthly data from January 1960 to December 2002 (a total of 
504 observations). The sample is divided into 3 periods consistent with the two struc-
tural changes that have taken place in the cotton market. The first period goes up to 
1972 (prior to the commodity crisis of 1973). The second period goes up to 1985 (when 
the US changed its policy stance and released huge stocks of cotton). The third period 
covers 1985 to 2002. Because the MUV—the preferred deflator for dollar-denominated 
commodity prices—is not available on monthly basis, the US consumer and producer 
price indices were used instead.   —5 1—
Table C1 reports the stationarity test statistics for levels without trend (upper 
panel), levels with trend (middle panel) and first differences (lower panel), deflated by 
the producer price index (first 3 columns) and the consumer price index (right 3 col-
umns). Results from the upper panel indicate that non-stationarity against the alterna-
tive of stationarity is not rejected (i.e. cotton prices are not stationary at levels). Results 
from the second panel indicate that, with the exception of PP test during the second pe-
riod which indicates trend stationarity at the 10% level, in all other cases the null hy-
pothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected. Thus, the prices have to be differenced 
once to become stationary. 
Therefore, in order to calculate price variability, one must rely on the Z-statistic. 
However, for the sake of comparison, the upper panel of table C2 reports statistics for 
both variability around trend (first column, denoted “Trend”) and the Z-statistic (sec-
ond column denoted “First differences”). The third column (denoted “Annual average”) 
reports the period average of the standard deviation for each crop year (i.e. first the 
standard deviation for each consecutive 12-month period is calculated, starting in Au-
gust an then the average of these standard deviations over the three periods is calcu-
lated). This statistic, in a sense, is as a measure of short term variability. 
The lower panel of table C2 gives the percentage change of price variability from 
one period to another. All three measures give the same qualitative outcome while there 
is no discernable difference when the producer or the consumer price index is consid-
ered. The main message from table C2 is that price variability during the post-1985 pe-
riod has been 2.5 times higher of what it was during the pre-1973 period while it is 
about half of what it was during the 1973-84 period. Figures C1 and C2 depict the 
within year variability. In particular, figure C1 shows the variability for each year aver-
aged over the three periods defined above—the averages are the ones reported in the 
last column of table C2, upper panel, 1.5, 7.5, 3.5, respectively. Figure C2 depicts the 
same numbers averaged differently. Specifically, the second period consists of only two 
years, the highly inflationary 1973 and 1974. Variability during the second and third pe-
riod increases to 16.8 (from 7.5) and 4.2 (from 3.5), respectively.   —5 2—
TABLE C1:  STATIONARITY STATISTICS 
  Deflated by Producer Price Index    Deflated by Consumer Price Index 
  ADF PP   ADF  PP 
Levels          
1960-72 -2.38  -2.21    -1.90  -2.00 
1973-84 -3.40*  -2.63    -2.48  -3.37* 
1985-2002 -2.53  -2.91    -2.67  -2.46 
Trend          
1960-72 -2.76  -2.63    -2.07  -2.02 
1973-84 -4.25**  -3.18*  -4.57***  -3.44** 
1985-2002 -2.69  -2.84    -2.06  -2.46 
First Differences          
1960-72 -4.40***  -10.20***   -5.32***  -8.31*** 
1973-84 -3.83**  -11.03***   -3.87**  -6.39*** 
1985-2002  -6.31***    -9.01***   -6.12***  -7.78*** 
Notes: ADF and PP denotes the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron statistics. The McKinnon 
critical values (properly adjusted for the number of observations) are: -4.00 (1%), -3.44 (5%), and –3.13 
(10%). Asterisks denote rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% 




TABLE C2:  PRICE VARIABILITY MEASURES 













Measure of Variability            
1960-72 11.7  3.7  4.8    3.8  1.2  1.5 
1973-84 39.6  12.8  19.7    13.8  4.6  7.0 
1985-2002 25.7  7.0  12.1    7.7  2.0  3.5 
Change (percent)          
1960-72 to 1973-84  238%  250% 309%   268%  279% 368% 
1960-72 to 1985-2002  120%  90% 151%   105%  66% 133% 
1973-84 to 1985-2002  -35%  -46% -39%    -44%  -56% -50% 
a. Variation around the trend for each period—equation (2). 
b. Variability around the average of the first differences of each period—equation (3) 
c. Variability around the average of each crop year (August-July) for each period; each period consists of 
12 observations—period average of equation (1). 
Source: Authors’ calculations.   —5 3—
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APPENDIX D:  THE COTLOOK A AND B INDICES 
The Cotlook A Index is the average of the 5 lowest quotations of 16 styles of cotton 
(Middling 1-3/32’’) traded in North European ports from the following origins: Austra-
lia, Brazil, China, Francophone Africa, Greece, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Spain, 
Syria, Tanzania, Turkey, the United States, and Uzbekistan. The Cotlook B Index is the 
average of the three lowest quotations of eight styles of coarser grades of cotton from 
Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Pakistan, Turkey, the United States, and Uzbekistan. 
The indices are compiled daily by Cotton Outlook, a private company located in 
Liverpool, UK. Staff collect quotations by interviewing cotton traders and merchants in 
North Europe, and they also look at other market developments likely to affect cotton 
prices. These offering prices and the day’s indices are published at about 2:30 p.m. UK 
time. 
The prices are expressed in U.S. cents per pound, c.i.f. North Europe, cash 
against documents on arrival of vessel, including profit and agent’s commission. When 
a particular cotton growth is not offered in large volume, the quotation is still reported, 
but it is not eligible to participate in the index. The index is based on the three or five 
least expensive quotations because quotations reflect offering prices, not the level at 
which business has been arranged, so a buyer would normally expect to succeed with 
bids that are slightly lower than quoted. 
The quotations represent nearby delivery, normally between two and four 
months. A dual quotation is reported when information on supply conditions of the 
next cotton season is readily available: one for nearby delivery and one for forward de-
livery. For example, quotations on July 12, 2001 referred to July/August 2001 delivery 
(nearby) and October 2001 to May 2002 delivery (forward). Table D1 depicts the compo-
sition of the Cotlook A and B Indices for three randomly selected dates: July 12 (nearby 
and forward delivery), August 30 ( nearby delivery), and October 18, 2001 (nearby de-
livery). 
Because the US quotations are among the highest, they are included in the A In-
dex very infrequently. On the contrary, the Francophone Africa quotation is included 
very often in the Index because the quotation is relatively low (and hence the chances of 
its eligibility high) and it also traded throughout the entire season.   —5 5—
TABLE D1 
COMPOSITION OF THE COTLOOK A AND B INDICES (US CENTS PER POUND) 
 
ORIGIN 
JULY 12, 2001 
(NEARBY) 
JULY 12, 2001 
(FORWARD) 
AUGUST 30, 2001 
(NEARBY) 
OCTOBER 18, 2001 
(NEARBY) 
Australia 50.00  52.25  51.50  44.25 
Brazil 46.50  46.00*  43.00*  NQ 
China NQ  NQ  NQ  NQ 
Franc Zone  47.00*  45.50*  43.25  38.00* 
Greece 44.00*  44.75*  42.00*  35.25* 
India NQ  NQ  NQ  NQ 
Mexico NQ  NQ  NQ  NQ 
Pakistan NQ  NQ  NQ  NQ 
Paraguay 45.00*  NQ  NQ  NQ 
Spain 49.50  46.00*  43.00*  38.25* 
Syria 47.00*  46.50  42.00*  36.00* 
Tanzania NQ  49.00  47.00  NQ 
Turkey NQ  NQ  NQ  NQ 
US (California/Arizona)  50.50  53.75  50.50  42.25 
US (Memphis/Eastern)  52.00  53.00  49.75  40.50 
Uzbekistan 47.00*  45.50*  42.50*  36.00* 
A Index  46.00  45.55  42.50  36.70 
Argentina 45.50@  NQ  NQ  NQ 
Brazil NQ  43.50@  40.50@  37.00 
China NQ  NQ  NQ  NQ 
India NQ  NQ  NQ  NQ 
Pakistan NQ  44.50@  41.50  33.50@ 
Turkey NQ  NQ  NQ  NQ 
US (Orleans/Texas)  43.00@  45.00  41.25@  34.00@ 
Uzbekistan 45.00@  44.00@  41.00@  34.50@ 
B Index  44.50  44.00  40.90  34.00 
NQ no quotation from this origin available that week. 
* quotation is one of the five less expensive origins. 
@ quotation is one of the three less expensive origins. 
Source:  Cotton Outlook, July 13, August 31, and October 19, 2001 issues.   —5 6—
APPENDIX E:  COTTON PRICE RISK MANAGEMENT 
Cotton was one of the first commodities to be traded in futures markets. Earlier in the 
20th century there were at least 10 active cotton futures exchanges (Baffes and Kaltsas 
2002). Currently, there is only one major cotton futures and options contract, which is 
traded at the New York Board of Trade. The New York contract, whose size is 50,000 
pounds, uses Memphis No. 2 cotton as the cash price equivalent for quality specification 
and delivery purposes. There are five delivery months (March, May, July, October, and 
December), and the nearest 10 delivery months are available for trade, extending the 
time span of the contract to almost two years—a July 2001 contract could be traded as 
early as August 1999. Table E1 reports the closing futures prices for the March, May, 
and July 2002 contracts on January 3, 11, and 13, 2002. It also reports the strike prices 
and costs for the corresponding put options. 
The New York contract is appropriate only for U.S. cotton, however. Non-U.S. 
cotton traders and merchants have no access to a hedging instrument. Cotton Outlook 
(December 12, 1997, p. 3) observed that the lack of an international trading instru-
ment—one that consistently reflects broad world cotton market developments but is 
capable of being used as hedge—continues to be a shortcoming of the current pricing 
system. The 59th ICAC Plenary Meeting in Cairns reached a similar conclusion (ICAC 
2001): 
Futures contracts traded in New York are limited to the delivery of U.S. cotton to U.S. 
locations. Accordingly, prices in New York reflect primarily U.S. conditions. As a conse-
quence, prices for cotton in non-U.S. locations can diverge from New York futures prices, 
limiting the utility of the New York market for many in the world industry. 
Comovement between the New York contract and the Cotlook A Index is low, confirm-
ing the inadequacy of the New York contract as a hedging tool for traders and mer-
chants of non-U.S. types of cotton. As an example, in December 31, 1990, the May 1991 
New York contract closed at 76.19 cents a pound, 8.21 cents below the Cotlook A Index, 
and it expired on May 8, 1991, at 92.22 cents a pound, 8.92 cents above the Cotlook A 
Index. In a study using an error-correction specification and weekly cotton prices (com-
ponents of the A Index) from August 1985 to December 1987 and August 1995 to Janu-
ary 1997, Baffes and Ajwad (2001) found that, unlike Central Asian, West African, and 
(to some extent) Greek prices, U.S. prices moved relatively independently of other 
prices. 
Several efforts have been made since the late 1990s to establish an international 
trading instrument for cotton (Baffes and Kaltsas 2002). Brazil reintroduced its cotton 
contract in 1996 and India in 1998. China, Euronext (the European Trading Alliance), 
Turkey, and the United States are also contemplating new initiatives. The Cotton Ex-
changes in Brazil and India are not used by foreign traders, but the one in Europe, if 
launched, is expected to trade Central Asian and West African cotton, making it a use-  —5 7—
ful hedging tool for traders and merchants of non-U.S. cotton. The Common Fund for 
Commodities has recently launched a project investigating ways to manage cotton price 
risk in Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, with the Cotton Company of Zimbabwe as 
the project executing agency. 
 
 
TABLE E1:  INDICATIVE COTTON FUTURES AND PUT OPTIONS STRIKE 
PRICES AND COSTS (CENTS PER POUND) 
 M ARCH 2002  MAY 2002  JULY 2002 
JANUARY 3, 2002  CLOSING FUTURES PRICE 
 36.46  37.90  39.30 
STRIKE PRICE C OST OF PUT OPTION 
38.00 2.44  2.58  2.50 
36.00 1.29  1.64  1.70 
34.00 0.56  0.95  1.10 
JANUARY 11, 2002  CLOSING FUTURES PRICE 
 37.40  38.88  40.40 
STRIKE PRICE C OST OF PUT OPTION 
40.00 3.15  3.15  2.69 
38.00 1.75  2.08  2.04 
36.00 0.83  1.26  1.33 
35.00 0.53  0.95  1.04 
JANUARY 13, 2002  CLOSING FUTURES PRICE 
 36.80  38.30  39.80 
STRIKE PRICE C OST OF PUT OPTION 
40.00 3.43  3.32  3.20 
38.00 1.84  2.18  2.22 
36.00 0.75  1.30  1.45 
Source:  The New York Board of Trade   —5 8—
APPENDIX F:  STATISTICAL TABLES 








(kilograms per hectare) 
PER CAPITA GDP
(1995 US dollars) 
AMERICAS       
United States  3,362  1,208  699  30,620 
Brazil 611  4  800  4,495 
Mexico 177  42  691  3,583 
Argentina 167  162 364  8,270 
Paraguay 74  60  442  1,768 
Peru 46  5  631  2,344 
Total 4,489  1,490    
AFRICA        
Egypt 232  103  776  1,166 
Mali 207  209  419  285 
Côte d'Ivoire  165  145  585  782 
Benin 138  135  360  398 
Zimbabwe 117  96  343 674 
Burkina Faso  115  112  392  249 
Cameroon 79  71  459  655 
Chad 69  67  230  224 
Togo 68  69  435  341 
Nigeria 58  18  199  252 
Sudan 54  51  398  290 
South Africa  42  9  369  3,946 
Tanzania 39  30  186  185 
Total 1,556  1,228    
EUROPE        
Greece 396  275  934  12,400 
Spain 118  58  1,143  16,802 
Total 514  384    
ASIA        
China 4,165  258  1,044  747 
India 2,729  27  306  438 
Pakistan 1,703  46 576  503 
Uzbekistan 1,064  897  700  467 
Turkey 831  65  1,127  3,072 
Australia 734  678  1,332  23,293 
Syria 321  226  1,409  858 
Turkmenistan 208 195  378  1,126 
Iran 141  0  641  1,580 
Tajikistan 104  87 413  352 
Kazakhstan 67  64  572  1,350 
Myanmar 54  27  216  — 
Israel 38  38  1,660  16,453 
Total 12,349  2,703    
WORLD 18,907  5,805  585   
Source.  International Cotton Advisory Committee and World Bank (World Development Indicators).   —5 9—
TABLE F2 
GLOBAL BALANCE OF THE COTTON MARKET (THOUSAND TONS), 1960-2002 
  1960 1970 1980 1990 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
PRODUCTION           
China  1,372 1,995 2,707 4,508 4,501 3,830 4,350 5,100 4,700 
US  3,147 2,219 2,422 3,376 3,030 3,835 3,818 4,393 3,879 
India  1,012  909 1,322 1,989 2,710 2,650 2,350 2,459 2,450 
Pakistan  306  543  714 1,638 1,480 1,800 1,750 1,743 1,717 
Uzbekistana  1,491 2,342 2,661 2,593 1,000 1,150  960 1,055 1,035 
Franc  Zone  63 140 224 562 897 928 700 991 902 
Turkey  192 400 500 655 871 826 740 900 900 
Brazil  425 549 623 717 420 648 848 725 785 
Australia  2  19  99 433 726 733 704 658 386 
Greece  63 110 115 213 405 428 420 410 355 
Egypt  480 509 529 296 230 229 206 279 293 
Syria  112 150 118 145 335 325 362 350 233 
World  10,201 11,740 13,831 18,970 18,551 18,887 18,901 20,856 19,076 
ENDING STOCKS          
US  1,574 915 653 510 849 860  1,174  1,826  2,222 
China  0  412  299 1,550 4,124 2,814 2,263 2,347 1,949 
India  635 376  59 539  1,011 910 848 812 583 
Brazil  144 321 391 231 317 370 505 536 401 
Pakistan  52  55 204 313 353 463 353 616 373 
Australia  5  13  61 150 424 431 371 378 348 
World  4,643 4,605 5,152 6,653 9,699 8,710 7,917 9,896 9,092 
CONSUMPTION          
China  1,481 2,016 3,300 4,225 4,400 4,800 5,050 5,500 5,700 
India  1,006 1,076 1,371 1,958 2,781 2,939 2,924 2,899 2,942 
Pakistan  245  429  461 1,343 1,625 1,700 1,760 1,900 2,000 
US  1,803 1,786 1,083 1,885 2,265 2,230 1,929 1,681 1,578 
Turkey  109  184  293  557 1,000 1,200 1,150 1,300 1,365 
Brazil  272 296 566 723 797 852 871 860 875 
Indonesia  10  43 104 336 438 470 480 530 500 
Mexico  109 146 165 170 484 525 435 430 418 
Thailand  15  65 127 328 290 340 360 385 400 
Russiaa  1,350  1,821  1,796  1,190 190 280 320 345 362 
Korea  59 117 322 436 320 325 320 325 330 
Italy  226 201 209 333 284 307 300 290 284 
Taiwan  46 137 229 346 290 295 250 260 260 
Bangladeshb  na  na  45  98 153 169 196 215 240 
Uzbekistana  na  na  na 205 125 185 220 250 225 
Japan  739 766 715 650 275 280 251 221 212 
World  10,231 12,173 14,215 18,585 18,674 19,756 19,753 20,152 20,535 
a. Uzbekistan and Russia refer to USSR prior to and including 1990. 
b. Included in Pakistan prior to 1970 and including 1970. 
Source:  ICAC, Cotton:  Review of the World Situation, various issues.   —6 0—
TABLE F3 
GLOBAL TRADE OF THE COTTON MARKET (THOUSAND TONS), 1960-2002 
  1960 1970 1980 1990 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
EXPORTS           
US  1,444  848 1,290 1,697  915 1,481 1,470 2,134 2,056 
Uzbekistana  381 553 616 397 900 900 820 718 717 
Australia  0  4  53 329 650 710 720 650 609 
Greece  33  0  13  86 230 294 293 257 249 
Mali  2  19  35 114 216 201 125 126 221 
Syria  97 134  71  91 210 180 245 220 171 
Benin  1  14  8  58 119 151 131 132 164 
Burkina  Faso  0  9  22  73 117 106 107 127 154 
Tajikistana  na  na  na 200  90  83 110 120 147 
Côte  d’Ivoire  0  7  42  81 130 160 150 115 137 
Zimbabwe  0 32 55 38 89  121  128 67  105 
World  3,667 3,875 4,414 5,081 5,274 6,054 5,875 6,167 6,377 
IMPORTS           
Indonesia  7  36 106 324 500 455 520 559 537 
India  204 155  0  0 136 200 340 425 509 
China  65 108 773 480  78  30  52 102 400 
Turkey  0  1  0  46 250 459 285 385 358 
Thailand  4  46  86 354 271 302 360 387 356 
Mexico  0  1  0  43 302 436 473 396 352 
Russiaa  0 238  28  37 179 284 325 341 338 
Italy  218 178 193 336 330 365 310 323 315 
Korea,  Rep.  51 121 332 447 330 350 315 318 298 
Japan  800 796 697 634 270 276 242 247 240 
Pakistan  1  1  1  0 192 103 101 280 224 
Taiwan  47 160 214 358 293 322 269 225 214 
Brazil  0  4  2 108 296 340 131  57 200 
World  3,804 4,086 4,555 5,222 5,429 5,811 5,875 6,167 6,377 
a. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Russia refer to USSR prior to and including 1990. 
Source:  ICAC, Cotton:  Review of the World Situation, various issues.   —6 1—
TABLE F4 
DIRECTION OF COTTON TRADE: 1980/81-2000/01 
  1980/81 1990/91 2000/01 
Million of $ US (Current)     
Industrial to Industrial Countries  1,287  1,631  726 
Industrial to Developing Countries  1,728  2,114  2,800 
Developing to Industrial Countries  951  1,232  898 
Developing to Developing Countries  599  1,896  1,951 
TOTAL  4,466 6,872 6,375 
Share (percent)     
Industrial to Industrial Countries  28  23  11 
Industrial to Developing Countries  38  31  44 
Developing to Industrial Countries  21  18  14 
Developing to Developing Countries  13  28  31 
TOTAL  100 100 100 
a.  Industrial countries are: US, EU (Greece and Spain), Australia, and Israel, currently accounting for 40 
percent of world exports (2.3 million tons out of 5.8 million tons). 
Source:  COMTRADE   —6 2—
TABLE F5:  COTTON PRICESa (US DOLLARS PER KILOGRAM), 1950-2002 
  MONTHLY   ANNUAL 
  JAN F EB M AR A PR M AY J UN J UL A UG S EP O CT N OV D EC   N OMINAL R EALb 
1950                            0.92  5.05 
1951          0.86  0.88  0.94  1.04  1.08    0.96  4.56 
1952  1.05 1.02 0.96 0.96 0.90 0.92 0.94 0.99 1.00 0.93 0.90 0.86    0.95  4.31 
1953  0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.38 0.82 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.84    0.83  3.87 
1954  0.86 0.82 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.85 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.88    0.86  4.10 
1955  0.88 0.88 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.82 0.78 0.76 0.77 0.75    0.82  3.84 
1956  0.77 0.82 0.84 0.82 0.75 0.71 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.72 0.73    0.74  3.34 
1957  0.74 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.77 0.78    0.74  3.28 
1958  0.79 0.76 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.72 0.68 0.68 0.66 0.68 0.66 0.63    0.71  3.09 
1959  0.63 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.66    0.63  2.78 
1960  0.65  0.65  0.65  0.64  0.65  0.66  0.66  0.65  0.66  0.67  0.67  0.66    0.65  2.81 
1961  0.66 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.66 0.66    0.67  2.85 
1962  0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.65    0.65  2.73 
1963  0.66 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.64    0.65  2.71 
1964  0.66 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.64    0.65  2.68 
1965  0.64 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.62    0.64  2.59 
1966  0.62 0.62 0.64 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.63 0.63 0.63    0.62  2.42 
1967  0.64 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.72    0.68  2.57 
1968  0.72 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.66 0.66 0.63 0.62    0.68  2.68 
1969  0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.60 0.61 0.63 0.65 0.66    0.63  2.31 
1970  0.64  0.65  0.66  0.66  0.66  0.67  0.67  0.68  0.69  0.70  0.71  0.72    0.63  2.25 
1971  0.73 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.75 0.79 0.80 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.85    0.74  2.51 
1972  0.89 0.90 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.83 0.78 0.74 0.73 0.78 0.81 0.86    0.79  2.46 
1973  0.89 0.91 0.96 1.03 1.15 1.22 1.46 1.67 1.91 1.93 1.75 1.82    1.36  3.63 
1974  1.99 1.84 1.69 1.61 1.47 1.40 1.32 1.33 1.32 1.26 1.17 1.09    1.42  3.11 
1975  1.05 1.06 1.09 1.16 1.22 1.23 1.25 1.31 1.33 1.32 1.30 1.35    1.16  2.30 
1976  1.47 1.52 1.54 1.56 1.61 1.80 2.00 1.92 1.88 1.92 1.91 1.84    1.69  3.31 
1977  1.75 1.86 1.92 1.89 1.78 1.61 1.57 1.51 1.43 1.39 1.41 1.42    1.55  2.81 
1978  1.46 1.53 1.58 1.60 1.63 1.60 1.55 1.59 1.63 1.67 1.73 1.71    1.57  2.45 
1979  1.68 1.67 1.69 1.64 1.68 1.70 1.70 1.71 1.72 1.72 1.77 1.82    1.69  2.36   —6 3—
TABLE F5:  COTTON PRICESa (US DOLLARS PER KILOGRAM), 1950-2002 (continued) 
  MONTHLY   ANNUAL 
  JAN F EB M AR A PR M AY J UN J UL A UG S EP O CT N OV D EC   N OMINAL R EALb 
1980  1.94  2.13  2.06  1.99  1.95  1.85  1.94  2.11  2.22  2.18  2.16  2.18    2.05  2.60 
1981  2.18 2.12 2.04 1.98 1.95 1.93 1.89 1.77 1.70 1.67 1.65 1.58    1.85  2.34 
1982  1.55 1.54 1.55 1.58 1.69 1.67 1.73 1.66 1.60 1.55 1.52 1.54    1.60  2.09 
1983  1.58 1.64 1.74 1.77 1.81 1.90 1.95 2.00 1.98 1.94 1.97 1.97    1.85  2.49 
1984  1.93 1.93 1.95 1.96 1.97 1.85 1.74 1.66 1.61 1.62 1.60 1.59    1.79  2.45 
1985  1.57 1.51 1.48 1.46 1.43 1.39 1.34 1.26 1.18 1.08 1.06 1.06    1.32  1.83 
1986  1.14 1.20 1.15 1.07 1.00 0.90 0.83 0.82 0.96 1.13 1.16 1.30    1.06  1.27 
1987  1.45 1.45 1.39 1.46 1.69 1.75 1.84 1.91 1.84 1.68 1.67 1.66    1.65  1.81 
1988  1.59 1.49 1.46 1.45 1.45 1.52 1.40 1.27 1.25 1.27 1.29 1.35    1.40  1.45 
1989  1.39 1.39 1.46 1.63 1.71 1.74 1.83 1.83 1.80 1.81 1.81 1.71    1.67  1.74 
1990  1.66  1.68  1.74  1.83  1.89  1.99  2.01  1.79  1.79  1.79  1.82  1.85    1.82  1.82 
1991  1.85 1.87 1.86 1.83 1.82 1.78 1.70 1.62 1.55 1.50 1.40 1.36    1.68  1.64 
1992  1.31 1.24 1.22 1.28 1.34 1.41 1.44 1.32 1.25 1.17 1.16 1.20    1.28  1.21 
1993  1.26 1.33 1.36 1.35 1.33 1.30 1.27 1.22 1.22 1.21 1.21 1.31    1.28  1.20 
1994  1.53 1.78 1.80 1.85 1.90 1.89 1.80 1.69 1.66 1.63 1.71 1.92    1.76  1.60 
1995  2.11 2.23 2.44 2.51 2.53 2.00 1.93 1.88 2.01 2.01 1.97 1.94    2.13  1.82 
1996  1.90 1.87 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.76 1.68 1.66 1.66 1.68 1.75    1.77  1.59 
1997  1.76 1.77 1.78 1.74 1.75 1.78 1.79 1.79 1.76 1.72 1.70 1.64    1.75  1.69 
1998  1.59 1.52 1.51 1.45 1.42 1.52 1.54 1.50 1.46 1.36 1.24 1.23    1.44  1.45 
1999  1.23 1.24 1.25 1.27 1.32 1.29 1.20 1.12 1.09 1.05 1.02 0.97    1.17  1.18 
2000  1.05  1.18  1.26  1.29  1.33  1.31  1.29  1.34  1.36  1.34  1.41  1.45    1.30  1.34 
2001  1.41 1.33 1.20 1.13 1.10 1.05 1.00 0.96 0.91 0.82 0.84 0.95    1.06  1.12 
2002  0.96 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.88 0.96 1.03 1.09 1.08 1.09 1.15 1.22    1.02  1.09 
2003  1.25 1.30 1.35 1.34 1.28 1.29 1.33 1.34 1.41 1.60 1.70 1.62    1.40  1.40 
a. Mexican c.i.f. North Europe up to July 1973; A Index since August 1973. 
b. Real prices have been deflated by the manufacture import unit value (1990 = 1.0). 
Source: World Bank Commodity Price Data.   —6 4—
TABLE F6: PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL FIBERS (THOUSAND TONS) 
1975-2000 
COUNTRY  1975 1980 1985 1990 1995  2000 
China  (Mainland) 156  418  912 1,557 2,719  6,711 
European  Union  2,450 2,694 2,816 2,781 2,713  3,429 
United  States  2,785 3,609 3,117 3,115 3,465  3,308 
China  (Taiwan)  284  636 1,145 1,769 2,550  3,264 
Korea,  Rep.  273  564  825 1,286 1,865  2,665 
India  155 203 335 653  1,000  1,866 
Japan  1,380 1,755 1,747 1,701 1,613  1,434 
Indonesia  8  96 187 323 820  1,261 
Thailand  39 103 111 203 539  822 
Turkey  51 104 194 305 464  747 
Mexico  185 267 326 370 530  602 
Pakistan  5  4 42 75  258  504 
Malaysia  3 36 39 42 61  414 
Brazil  175 283 269 262 281  347 
Americas  3,415 4,488 4,074 4,452 4,702  4,660 
Africa  36  77 143 166 235  245 
Europe  4,443 5,143 5,590 5,579 3,797  3,429 
Asia  2,421 4,010 5,668 7,293  12,064  19,999 
Worlda  10,314 13,718 15,475 17,672 20,797  28,335 
a.  World denotes the world total which includes countries not listed here. 
Source.  International Cotton Advisory Committee.   —6 5—
TABLE F7: GLOBAL FIBER CONSUMPTION, 1960-2002 
 C ONSUMPTION (THOUSAND TONS)   SHARE (PERCENT) 
YEAR T OTAL C OTTON W OOL C HEMICAL   C OTTON W OOL C HEMICAL 
1960  15,153  10,356  1,495  3,302    68.3  9.9  21.8 
1961 15,102  10,085 1,505  3,512    66.8 10.0  23.3 
1962  15,339 9,902  1,501  3,936   64.6  9.8  25.7 
1963 16,003  10,147 1,475  4,381    63.4  9.2  27.4 
1964 17,256  10,830 1,460  4,966    62.8  8.5  28.8 
1965 18,182  11,318 1,473  5,391    62.2  8.1  29.7 
1966 18,796  11,539 1,545  5,712    61.4  8.2  30.4 
1967 19,212  11,695 1,473  6,044    60.9  7.7  31.5 
1968 20,434  11,763 1,565  7,106    57.6  7.7  34.8 
1969 21,248  11,911 1,604  7,733    56.1  7.5  36.4 
1970  22,041  12,405  1,500  8,136    56.3  6.8  36.9 
1971 23,037  12,493 1,480  9,064    54.2  6.4  39.3 
1972 24,417  12,903 1,578  9,936    52.8  6.5  40.7 
1973 26,031  13,288 1,443  11,300    51.0  5.5  43.4 
1974 25,267  12,986 1,262  11,019    51.4  5.0  43.6 
1975 24,717  13,047 1,358  10,312    52.8  5.5  41.7 
1976 26,537  13,211 1,515  11,811    49.8  5.7  44.5 
1977 27,025  13,117 1,478  12,430    48.5  5.5  46.0 
1978 28,246  13,415 1,481  13,350    47.5  5.2  47.3 
1979 29,440  13,897 1,558  13,985    47.2  5.3  47.5 
1980  29,580  14,295  1,567  13,718    48.3  5.3  46.4 
1981 29,731  14,124 1,576  14,031    47.5  5.3  47.2 
1982 28,895  14,248 1,556  13,091    49.3  5.4  45.3 
1983 30,166  14,548 1,612  14,006    48.2  5.3  46.4 
1984 31,251  14,830 1,621  14,800    47.5  5.2  47.4 
1985 32,813  15,768 1,625  15,420    48.1  5.0  47.0 
1986 34,956  17,462 1,708  15,786    50.0  4.9  45.2 
1987 36,546  18,226 1,754  16,566    49.9  4.8  45.3 
1988 37,427  18,210 1,904  17,313    48.7  5.1  46.3 
1989 38,228  18,677 1,861  17,690    48.9  4.9  46.3 
1990  37,882  18,602  1,628  17,652    49.1  4.3  46.6 
1991 38,070  18,563 1,801  17,706    48.8  4.7  46.5 
1992 38,872  18,628 1,757  18,488    47.9  4.5  47.6 
1993 39,109  18,544 1,649  18,916    47.4  4.2  48.4 
1994 40,392  18,427 1,723  20,242    45.6  4.3  50.1 
1995 40,792  18,425 1,554  20,813    45.2  3.8  51.0 
1996 42,296  18,821 1,440  22,035    44.5  3.4  52.1 
1997 45,086  19,059 1,361  24,666    42.3  3.0  54.7 
1998 45,481  18,707 1,293  25,481    41.1  2.8  56.0 
1999 47,071  19,162 1,350  26,559    40.7  2.9  56.4 
2000  49,416  19,791  1,281  28,344    40.0  2.6  57.4 
2001 49,603  20,080 1,401  28,122    40.5  2.8  56.7 
2002 50,021  20,656 1,357  30,008    39.7  2.6  57.7 
Source.  International Cotton Advisory Committee.   —6 6—
TABLE F8:  FIBER PRICES (US $ PER KILOGRAM), 1960-2002 
 N OMINAL   R EAL 
Year A  Index  Wool  Rayon Polyester MUVa  A Index  Wool  Rayon  Polyester 
1960  0.65  1.34  0.62  2.78  0.23  2.81  5.81  2.67  12.01 
1961  0.67  1.39  0.57  2.60 0.24 2.85 5.91 2.43  11.03 
1962  0.65  1.22  0.57  2.51 0.24 2.73 5.09 2.39  10.46 
1963  0.65  1.43  0.60  2.51 0.24 2.71 6.05 2.52  10.66 
1964  0.65  1.51  0.62  2.16 0.24 2.68 6.30 2.58  9.04 
1965  0.64  1.26  0.60  1.85 0.24 2.59 5.22 2.47  7.67 
1966  0.62  1.36  0.57  1.79 0.25 2.42 5.45 2.29  7.14 
1967  0.68  1.22  0.53  1.28 0.25 2.57 4.83 2.09  5.06 
1968  0.68  1.17  0.55  1.21 0.25 2.68 4.66 2.20  4.85 
1969  0.63  1.32  0.57  0.99 0.26 2.31 5.00 2.17  3.76 
1970  0.63  0.98  0.55  0.90  0.28  2.25  3.50  1.96  3.22 
1971  0.74  0.80  0.60  0.84 0.29 2.51 2.70 2.02  2.84 
1972  0.79  1.18  0.68  0.79 0.32 2.46 3.66 2.12  2.47 
1973  1.36  3.05  0.73  0.84 0.37 3.63 8.18 1.95  2.25 
1974  1.42  2.52  1.12  1.01 0.45 3.11 5.54 2.47  2.23 
1975  1.16  1.82  1.12  1.10 0.51 2.30 3.61 2.23  2.18 
1976  1.69  1.98  1.19  1.19 0.51 3.31 3.87 2.33  2.33 
1977  1.55  2.27  1.32  1.23 0.55 2.81 4.11 2.39  2.23 
1978  1.57  2.35  1.28  1.19 0.64 2.45 3.66 1.99  1.85 
1979  1.69  2.55  1.43  1.30 0.72 2.36 3.55 2.00  1.82 
1980  2.05  3.02  1.63  1.61  0.79  2.60  3.84  2.07  2.04 
1981  1.85  3.28  1.90  1.74 0.79 2.34 4.16 2.40  2.21 
1982  1.60  3.07  1.85  1.69 0.77 2.09 4.01 2.42  2.21 
1983  1.85  2.70  1.76  1.61 0.74 2.49 3.62 2.37  2.16 
1984  1.79  2.81  1.85  1.74 0.73 2.45 3.86 2.54  2.39 
1985  1.32  2.59  1.74  1.46 0.72 1.83 3.59 2.41  2.03 
1986  1.06  2.38  1.67  1.37 0.83 1.27 2.87 2.01  1.66 
1987  1.65  3.44  1.79  1.47 0.91 1.81 3.78 1.97  1.61 
1988  1.40  5.67  2.00  1.63 0.97 1.45 5.86 2.07  1.68 
1989  1.67  5.21  2.42  1.91 0.96 1.74 5.41 2.52  1.98 
1990  1.82  4.47  2.64  1.83  1.00  1.82  4.47  2.64  1.83 
1991  1.68  3.08  2.69  1.62 1.02 1.64 3.02 2.64  1.59 
1992  1.28  3.03  2.52  1.62 1.06 1.21 2.86 2.37  1.53 
1993  1.28  2.40  2.46  1.60 1.07 1.20 2.25 2.30  1.50 
1994  1.76  3.23  2.27  1.65 1.11 1.60 2.92 2.06  1.50 
1995  2.13  3.96  2.62  1.96 1.17 1.82 3.38 2.24  1.67 
1996  1.77  3.26  2.59  1.75 1.11 1.59 2.94 2.33  1.58 
1997  1.75  3.59  2.54  1.51 1.03 1.69 3.49 2.45  1.46 
1998  1.44  2.75  2.42  1.34 1.00 1.45 2.75 2.43  1.34 
1999  1.17  2.38  2.17  1.14 0.99 1.18 2.40 2.19  1.15 
2000  1.30  3.53  2.15  1.26  0.97  1.34  3.64  2.21  1.29 
2001  1.06  2.60  2.17  1.33 0.96 1.14 2.71 2.26  1.39 
2002  1.02  3.72  2.16  1.32 0.96 1.04 3.88 2.24  1.37 
a. Denotes the deflator, Manufactures Import Unit Value (1990 = 1.0). 
Source.  World Bank (A Index and MUV) and International Cotton Advisory Committee.   —6 7—
TABLE F9 
VALUE OF EXPORTS OF OLD CLOTHING (MILLION US DOLLARS): 1975-2000 
COUNTRY  1980/81 1985/86  1990/91 1995/96  2000/01 
Industrial to Developing Countries       
United  States  81.0  81.1  116.6 227.3 188.5 
Germany  8.8  14.9  36.0 103.5 123.0 
United  Kingdom  3.5  8.1  20.8 71.4 92.4 
Belgium  28.7 35.9  64.9 97.9 70.8 
Netherlands  21.3 22.6  42.0 69.8 69.6 
Italy  1.5  3.4  28.3 57.1 52.7 
Japan  20.7 27.6  40.8 49.9 46.5 
Canada  2.5  4.8  11.0 43.0 39.0 
France  7.2  8.0  19.4 29.9 31.9 
Australia  5.2  5.1  7.6 19.1 13.4 
Switzerland  0.1 0.2  0.7 6.0 9.8 
Sweden  2.2 1.1  4.2 5.9 7.8 
ALL  185.9 217.2  399.2 795.4 765.1 
Industrial to Industrial Countries     
ALL  223.0 218.4  262.1 393.5 247.9 
Developing to Developing Countries     
ALL  8.9  11.0  49.3 159.4 220.1 
Developing to Industrial Countries     
ALL  5.0  10.5  24.3 127.7 163.6 
WORLD  422.7  457.2  734.9 1,476.0 1,396.8 
Source.  COMTRADE. 
Notes: The 4-digit SITC code is 2690 and is defined as “Old clothing and other old textile articles; rags.” 
The two 5-digit SITC codes (26901 and 26902) are defined as: “Clothing, cloth accessories, travel rugs & 
blankets” and “used or new rags, scrap twine, cordage, rope & cables.” The 26901 code share of the 2690 
code for the five two-year periods reported in the table are: 22.6%, 45.2%, 55.9%, 66.5%, 75.2%, and 80.7%.   —6 8—
TABLE F10 
A CHRONOLOGY OF THE US COMMODITY PROGRAMS WITH COTTON PROVISIONS 
PROGRAM Y EAR M AIN PROVISIONS 
Agricultural Marketing Act  1929  This Act was the first comprehensive program with the objective to stabilize commodity prices and farm 
income. It created the Federal Farm Board, which made loans to marketing cooperatives for the purchase 
and storage of surplus commodities, including cotton. 
Agricultural Adjustment Act  1933  Aimed to control production and increase prices of designated “basic” commodities, including cotton to be 
achieved by restoring farm purchasing power to its 1910-14 average level, a concept which became known 
as “parity.” In response to low prices during 1933, the “non-recourse” loans (a form of floor price) were in-
troduced. Marketing quotas were also legislated in 1934 to prevent non-participants in the acreage control 
program from sharing its financial benefits. 
Supreme Court Decision  1936  The production control and financial features of the 1933 Act were declared unconstitutional. 
Soil Conservation and Domes-
tic Allotment Act 
1936  Provided for payments to farmers who agreed to adopt soil-building practices and shift land from “soil-
depleting” surplus crops such as cotton to “soil-conserving” crops such as legumes. 
Agricultural Adjustment Act  1938  Provided for mandatory prices support loans and marketing loans keyed to acreage allotments. While the 
cotton acreage declined considerably, output did not because of increasing yields. 
Agricultural Act  1948  Provided for mandatory price support for cotton at 90 percent of parity if producers approved marketing 
loans. Subsequent legislation extended this level of support through 1954. 
Agricultural Act  1954  Renewed acreage allotments and marketing quotas due to increased production and stocks. Marketing quo-
tas continued until 1970. 
Agricultural Act  1956  Established the Soil Bank, the objective of which was to: (i) reduce the amount of land planted to allotment 
crops and (ii) provide long-term retirement of cropland to conservation uses. 
Cotton-Wheat Act  1964  Authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to make payments to domestic textile mills in order to bring the 
price of cotton used in the United States down to the export price. The allotment was also reduced. This Act 
was the beginning of voluntary program for reducing cotton production. 
Food and Agriculture Act  1965  Established a cropland adjustment program and introduced price support, set at 90 percent of estimated 
world price level. For the first time, trade of allotments with a state was allowed. 
continued    N     —6 9—
TABLE F10 (continued) 
A CHRONOLOGY OF THE US COMMODITY PROGRAMS WITH COTTON PROVISIONS 
PROGRAM Y EAR M AIN PROVISIONS 
Agricultural Act  1970  Provided for a cropland set-aside program while it suspended the marketing quotas. It also imposed an 
upper limit of $55,000 on program payments. This limit, however, had no impact as large producers di-
vided ownership of their farms. 
Agriculture and Consumer 
Protection Act 
1973  Introduced target prices and disaster payments in recognition that agriculture faces weather and market 
extremes which can result in low incomes. Payments would be made only if target prices fell below a cer-
tain level. The set-aside program continued. 
Food and Agriculture Act  1977  Set target prices on the basis of the costs of production and a formula using cost estimates was used for 
subsequent adjustments. The Act facilitated a shift of cotton production to lower cost regions of the West 
and Southwest. 
Agriculture and Food Act  1981  Focused on price and income support and provisions affecting their adjustment. Support was based on his-
torical moving average of per acre costs and actual yields. The Act also had provisions for acreage reduc-




1984  Reduced the target price from 86 cents per pound set by the 1981 Act to 81 cents per pound. It also re-
quired more land to be set-aside for conservation. 
Food Security Act  1985  Retained major features of past programs, namely acreage limitations, nonrecourse loans, and target prices 
but it gave more power to the Secretary of Agriculture. It specified declining target prices and introduced 
the concept of deficiency payments. 
Agricultural Reconciliation Act  1987  Reduced minimum price to 75.9 cents per pound from 81 cents per pound. 
Food, Agriculture, Conserva-
tion, and Trade Act 
1990  Target prices and deficiency payments continued. It introduced a new 3-step procedure in order to keep 
US cotton competitive. The second step, the so-called Step-2 payment, is an export subsidy. 
Federal Agricultural Im-
provement and Reform Act 
1996  Introduced de-coupled support, i.e. payments based on historical area and output but it retained loan 
rates. The Act was supplemented by a number of emergency payments during 1999-2001. 
Farm Security and Rural In-
vestment Act 
2002  Legitimized the emergency payments introduced in 1999. It raised the target prices and loosened the eligi-
bility criteria for support. 
Source: Stults et al. (1989) and Glade et al. (1995).   —7 0—
TABLE F11 
DIRECT GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO COTTON PRODUCERS, 1997/98-2001/02 
 1997/98  1998/99  1999/20000  2000/01  2001/01  2002/03 
Total production assistance (million US dollars)      
US  597 1,480 2,056  1,020  3,001  1,996 
China  2,013 2,648 1,534  1,900  1,196  750 
Greece  659 660 596  537  735  718 
Spain  211 204 199  179  245  239 
Turkey  na 220 199  106 59 57 
Brazil  29 52 44  44  10  na 
Mexico  13 15 28  23  18 7 
Egypt 290  na  20  14  23  33 
Total  3,812 5,279 4,764  3,822  5,287  3,814 
Assistance per kilogram produced (US dollars)     
US 0.15 0.49 0.56  0.27  0.61 0.54 
China  0.44 0.59 0.40  0.43  0.22 0.16 
Greece  1.94 1.85 1.37  1.27  1.72 1.97 
Spain  1.82 1.96 1.51  1.90  2.33 2.42 
Turkey  na 0.25 0.36  0.12  0.07 0.07 
Brazil  0.07 0.10 0.06  0.05  0.02  na 
Mexico  0.06 0.07 0.21  0.19  0.20 0.18 
Egypt 0.85  na  0.09  0.11  0.07  0.11 
Cotlook A Index (July/August Average, US dollars per kilogram)     
  1.60 1.30  1.16  1.26  0.92 1.23 
Assistance as a percent of the Cotlook A Index       
US 9%  38%  48% 22%  75%  44% 
China 27%  45%  35% 34%  24%  13% 
Greece 121%  142%  118% 101%  187%  160% 
Spain 114%  151%  130%  151%  253%  197% 
Turkey na  19%  31%  10%  7%  5% 
Brazil 4%  8%  6%  4%  2%  na 
Mexico 4%  5%  18%  15%  22%  15% 
Egypt  53% Na  7%  9%  7% 9% 
a. Data for 2001/02 are preliminary. 
Source:  International Cotton Advisory Committee (2002 and 2003).   —7 1—
TABLE F12 













1970/71  39  19  76  75  4  49 
1971/72  38  20 66 75  3 60 
1972/73  48  18 77 78  2 51 
1973/74  30  40 65 50  1 57 
1974/75  52  40 72 31  1 58 
1975/76  61  19 42 25  1 47 
1976/77  82  35 67 14  3 51 
1977/78  40  51 50 20  3 60 
1978/79  38  55  56 7 5  57 
1979/80  29  65  61 5 9  65 
1980/81  27  58  43  4  6  62 
1981/82  21  38  40 5 5  56 
1982/83  20  27 44 10 12 60 
1983/84  13  36 48 12 16 91 
1984/85  16  46 31 16 11  103 
1985/86  10  47 67  5 12 89 
1986/87  28  61  78 3 7  87 
1987/88  30  78 54  2 24  116 
1988/89  48  78 35  3 12 92 
1989/90  41  60  48 4 9  67 
1990/91  36  49  85  8  20  72 
1991/92  38  20  96 7 9  88 
1992/93  63  15  45 9 9  75 
1993/94  52  27 40  5 13 60 
1994/95  45  24  82 6 9  38 
1995/96  60  45 87 10 30  104 
1996/97  50  31 62 21 35  101 
1997/98  70  42 36  7 42  105 
1998/99  65  53 35 15 36  130 
1999/2000  50  30 42 22 30  128 
2000/01  55  36  45  19  24  152 
2001/02  60  18 63 20 35 75 
2002/03  55  21 67 22 43  122 
Source:  International Cotton Advisory Committee, Cotton:  Review of the World Situation.   —7 2—
TABLE F13 















1970/71  14  8  14  35  12  20  2 
1971/72  18 10 16 41 20 25  3 
1972/73  17 12 17 39 21 24  2 
1973/74  17 10 10 43 23 19  3 
1974/75  12 11 15 53 24 23  4 
1975/76 8 18 19 65 26 39  4 
1976/77 7 20 18 54 31 45  3 
1977/78 6 14 15 45 41 42  2 
1978/79 7 22 23 50 47 48  5 
1979/80  10 29 31 33 59 56  8 
1980/81  6  23  32  31  56  41  10 
1981/82 6 22 31 26 56 38  9 
1982/83  12 29 29 38 66 50 11 
1983/84  17 30 37 60 58 55 10 
1984/85  33 34 38 36 88 55 22 
1985/86  34 46 45 39 82 67 26 
1986/87  48 66 48 34 93 79 32 
1987/88  27 59 45 48  114 75 28 
1988/89  44 59 69 53  128 97 33 
1989/90  43 62 43 58  107 99 36 
1990/91  59  77  47  60  116  115  41 
1991/92  75 69 47 68 87  114 42 
1992/93 69  69  53  47 106 135  42 
1993/94 103  51  52  37  116  101  35 
1994/95  98 63 63 61 93  128 54 
1995/96  141 64 79 62 96  169 42 
1996/97 143  90  90  86  114  190  61 
1997/98  150 140  78 103 147 218  73 
1998/99  123 119  79  64 157 217  78 
1999/2000  152 109  79  74 173 197  56 
2000/01  141  116  95  58  125  102  49 
2001/02  172 158 102  68 173 240  70 
2002/03  137 144  83  60 162 200  64 
Source:  International Cotton Advisory Committee, Cotton:  Review of the World Situation.   —7 3—
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